Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World : A Model for Responsible Disclosure in Homeland Security by Bernard, Gregory M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-03
Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World : A Model for
Responsible Disclosure in Homeland Security
Bernard, Gregory M.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
WHISTLEBLOWING IN A WIKILEAKS WORLD:  









 Thesis Co-Advisors: Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez 
  John Rollins 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World: A Model for 
Responsible Disclosure in Homeland Security 
6. AUTHOR(S) Gregory M. Bernard 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ________N/A________.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Whistleblowing serves as a check/balance system to the government bureaucracy, helping to bypass administrative roadblocks and 
to provide a mechanism through which homeland security can monitor and increase efficiency in its operations. However, 
homeland security also deals with information that can be of a sensitive or secret nature, the unauthorized disclosure of which can 
cause damage to both homeland security efforts and national security. The current process for the authorized submission of 
whistleblowing information fails to provide whistleblowers the protections they require, instead encouraging whistleblowers to 
disclose information to the media or through stateless news organizations like Wikileaks to prevent reprisals. 
The technological capability to provide whistleblowers protections through anonymity currently exists, and has been 
demonstrated to be effective. By leveraging those technologies and setting up an authorized process for responsible disclosure, 
through which homeland security employees can submit whistleblowing information without fear of reprisals, it may increase the 
likelihood of whistleblowers reporting issues in the first place, and reduce the number of leaks to unauthorized recipients 
(media/stateless news organizations).  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
145 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Whistleblowing, Wikileaks, Responsible Disclosure, Anonymity, Homeland 
Security, Overclassification, Information Sharing, Public Trust, Government, Bureaucracy, 
Transparency, Secrecy, Fraud, Waste, Abuse, Organizational Misconduct, Protection, Retaliation, 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
WHISTLEBLOWING IN A WIKILEAKS WORLD: A MODEL FOR 
RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
Gregory M. Bernard 
Branch Chief, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 
B.A., University of Maryland, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Daniel Moran, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs  
 iv
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Whistleblowing serves as a check/balance system to the government bureaucracy, 
helping to bypass administrative roadblocks and to provide a mechanism through which 
homeland security can monitor and increase efficiency in its operations. However, 
homeland security also deals with information that can be of a sensitive or secret nature, 
the unauthorized disclosure of which can cause damage to both homeland security efforts 
and national security. The current process for the authorized submission of 
whistleblowing information fails to provide whistleblowers the protections they require, 
instead encouraging whistleblowers to disclose information to the media or through 
stateless news organizations like Wikileaks to prevent reprisals. 
The technological capability to provide whistleblowers protections through 
anonymity currently exists, and has been demonstrated to be effective. By leveraging 
those technologies and setting up an authorized process for responsible disclosure, 
through which homeland security employees can submit whistleblowing information 
without fear of reprisals, it may increase the likelihood of whistleblowers reporting issues 
in the first place, and reduce the number of leaks to unauthorized recipients 
(media/stateless news organizations).  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction—A dramatic change in the information-sharing environment has 
occurred over the last decade. New technologies, the rapid evolution of the Internet, and 
innovations in social media have provided the ability to gather and share information at 
an unprecedented level. The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government touts the virtues 
of transparency, while Congress defines whistleblowing and the disclosure of 
government fraud/waste/abuse as a “civic duty”, and yet the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) process is broken, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) is woefully 
inadequate, and secrecy continues to run rampant. The disclosure of hundreds of 
thousands of potentially classified documents to the organization Wikileaks may be an 
example of what this contradiction has caused. The existence of Wikileaks as an 
organization is irrelevant now, and their most significant contribution is not the release of 
1.2 million documents. Rather, the most significant impact of Wikileaks is their 
successful demonstration and validation of the ‘Wikileaks model.’ Wikileaks has 
demonstrated the power of the Internet using web technologies to provide protections 
through anonymity, while giving individuals access to a worldwide audience. The current 
troubles faced by the organization may or may not portend the end of Wikileaks; 
however, it does provide a glimpse into the future of whistleblowing. Building upon the 
apparent success of the Wikileaks model, the Wall Street Journal and Al-Jazeera have 
both implemented “anonymous” whistleblower submission sites. This new paradigm for 
communications, as enabled by the innovative uses of the Internet and social media, 
provides both opportunities and areas for concern regarding government transparency.  
Problem Statement—Whistleblowing serves as a critical check and balance 
system to government bureaucracy, helping to circumvent administrative roadblocks and 
to provide a mechanism through which homeland security can monitor and increase 
efficiency in its operations. Homeland security also deals with information that can be of 
a sensitive or secret nature, the unauthorized disclosure of which can cause damage to 
both homeland security efforts and national security. Maintaining the balance between 
secrecy and transparency is a difficult proposition; however, current government efforts, 
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particularly its handling of whistleblowers, places that balance in jeopardy. The 
government has taken some steps to address some of these problems; however, the 
government has also taken extreme measures to prosecute any whistleblowers who stray 
outside the appropriate submission process (i.e., deemed an unauthorized leak of 
sensitive/classified information) or are not protected by the WPA. Instead of 
acknowledging that current policy on whistleblowers is broken, the government’s current 
course of action decreases the likelihood important fraud/waste/abuse information will be 
received from whistleblowers, while possibly influencing their decision and encouraging 
them to bypass authorized channels and instead utilize the Internet to protect themselves 
from identification and retaliation. The current lack of public trust in government, and the 
existence of alternative avenues for disclosure that provide greater protections than those 
currently offered by the U.S. Government, serve to exacerbate the problem.  
Research Question—What policy model and associated technological process 
could the U.S. DHS implement that will encourage whistleblowers to submit information 
through authorized channels as opposed to leaking information to unauthorized parties? 
Analysis—To answer the research question, this thesis explores three primary 
areas. The first is the whistleblowing environment, to include definitions, applicable 
policies, laws (both domestic and international), authorized and unauthorized processes, 
motivations, public trust, requirements, and intentions of all parties involved. The second 
area of focus is technology, specifically, the available options, best practices, and 
vulnerabilities of potential technological solutions (e.g., phone, email, web). The final 
portion of thesis serves to develop and evaluate policy options based on the findings and 
conclusions identified in the first two areas of analysis. Those findings are as follows. 
• Overclassification is a problem 
• Information sharing is critical to both U.S. security and U.S democracy  
• Homeland security efforts require public (to include its employees and 
partners) trust and support to succeed  
• The ability to keep secrets and maintain control of classified information 
will continue to decrease 
• Decreasing overclassification will save the United States money 
• Whistleblowing is a civic duty 
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• The government is committed to providing whistleblower protections 
• Whistleblowers are in large part motivated by patriotism 
• Anonymity is a positive incentive for whistleblowers 
• Fourth and Fifth Estates (media and stateless news organizations) provide 
alternatives to the government process 
• Public trust in the government has declined 
• Public trust can be increased through the use of third parties 
• Technology exists to provide anonymity to whistleblowers 
• Current options for whistleblowing are inadequate 
These premises form the foundation and justification for the implementation of 
any solution.  
Current legitimate/authorized processes, such as submission through standard 
government channels, present significant risks to the whistleblower. 
Clandestine/unauthorized processes, such as the Internet (Wikileaks) and mainstream 
media, represent a clear breach of the law, which is in conflict with the “do the right 
thing” mindset of many whistleblowers. If whistleblowers had a way to communicate 
identified issues through an authorized third party that would serve as a proxy on their 
behalf, it would undermine the current processes (both legitimate and clandestine), 
potentially making them obsolete. It would reduce the personal risk faced by 
whistleblowers by providing the anonymity that makes the clandestine approach 
attractive, without clearly breaking the law. The Department of Homeland Security has 
an opportunity to build upon and improve the “Wikileaks Model,” to harness its use of 
technology and process to create a solution that would meet the needs of both 
whistleblowers and the government. If implemented correctly, the number of legitimate 
whistleblower complaints would increase (overall submissions would increase), and the 
number of whistleblowers who choose unauthorized avenues would be expected to 
decrease. 
Recommendation—For any solution to be considered successful, it is critical to 
establish a clear definition of success. This thesis proposes the following definition of 
success for any whistleblowing solution. 
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To promote the voluntary disclosure of information by any man or woman 
who reasonably believes that organizational wrongdoing has occurred, the 
facilitation of corrective action to address the wrongdoing, and providing 
for the protection of the submitter while maintaining information security, 
all within the bounds of U.S. law. 
Four key pillars create the foundation for success. 
• Whistleblowers must have the support of leadership  
• Legislation and policies must be clear and straightforward  
• Whistleblowing policies must enforce accountability  
• Authorized channels must provide at least as much protection as 
unauthorized channels 
The conclusions drawn in this thesis, including the policy model ultimately 
recommended, is based on the research and the findings identified above. Combined with 
a current understanding of the problem, the evaluation criteria, and the potential solutions 
available, it is recommended that the government establish a partnership with a non-
government organization (NGO) within U.S. legal jurisdiction, and subsidize the 
establishment of a government sponsored whistleblower submission website and virtual 
private network. This solution would allow whistleblowers to submit information to the 
government with the protection of anonymity, through the third party NGO. Establishing 
this policy provides whistleblowers who truly believe in improving government 
operations through the submission of information on fraud/waste/abuse or other types of 
concerns, a legitimate way to achieve their goal without risking their career and future on 
the weak whistleblower protections currently in place. While it may not completely 
eliminate leaks to the media or organizations, such as Wikileaks, the researcher believes 
those leaks will decrease as more whistleblowers give the government an opportunity to 
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In February of 1777, just months after our founding fathers signed the Declaration 
of Independence, 10 sailors who had joined the U.S. Navy to fight for independence from 
Great Britain, met on board the warship Warren. They met, not to plan a battle against 
the King’s armies, but rather to vet their concerns about the incompetence and lack of 
moral integrity of the commander in chief of the Continental Navy, Commodore Esek 
Hopkins. These sailors were devoted to fighting and winning the War for Independence. 
They were revolutionaries, risking their lives to build a free and independent America; 
they wanted nothing more than to fight and defeat their British foes. However, they 
feared that their commander could not successfully lead them. They blew the whistle on 
his mistreatment of prisoners, petitioning the Continental Congress and stating Hopkins 
had “treated prisoners in the most inhuman and barbarous manner.” Congress acted on 
the information they received and removed Hopkins from office. Unfortunately, the 
incident did not end there. Hopkins had not only held the top Navy job, but also came 
from a powerful colonial family; his brother was governor of Rhode Island and one of the 
original signers of the Declaration of Independence. Hopkins sought revenge against the 
whistleblowers—retaliating against them both during his short remaining tenure as 
commander and after he was stripped of his command. On July 30, 1778, the Continental 
Congress came to the whistleblowers defense (Kohn, 2011).  
Subsequently, the Continental Congress, without any recorded dissent, passed a 
resolution that encouraged all citizens to blow the whistle on official misconduct. It read: 
That it is the duty of all persons in the service of the United States, as well 
as all other inhabitants thereof, to give the earliest information to Congress 
or any other proper authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors 
committed by any officers or persons in the services of these states, which 






Whistleblowers have played a key role in government affairs since the founding 
fathers, facing significant personal risks of reprisals and retaliation to perform their 
patriotic duty to ensure the nation’s safety and security. In the 236 years since then, and 
despite the best efforts of Congress, those risks remain.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A dramatic change in the information-sharing environment has occurred over the 
last decade. New technologies, the rapid evolution of the Internet, and innovations in 
social media have provided the ability to gather and share information at an 
unprecedented level. The government’s failure to adapt to the new environment and 
adequately address its over-classification problem (Hall, 2005), combined with a decline 
in investigative journalism and traditional news media’s increasing inability to serve as a 
government watchdog, has created a public backlash, which is a particularly important 
issue for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The homeland security enterprise 
is comprised of “Federal, State, local tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-
sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a common 
national interest in the safety and security of America and the American population” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). From suspicious activity reporting and 
contributing to the deterrence of terrorist activities, to leveraging public preparedness to 
empower communities, help minimize fear, and diminish the effectiveness of terrorist 
tactics, the public plays a key role in homeland security efforts (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (National Commision On Terrorist Attacks Upon The 
United States, 2004) found that existing trends of over-classification and secrecy 
deprived intelligence and law enforcement of a potent weapon against terrorism: an alert 
and well-informed American public (National Commision On Terrorist Attacks Upon 
The United States, 2004). Over-classification and the accompanying lack of transparency 





The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government touts the virtues of transparency, 
while Congress defines whistleblowing and the disclosure of government 
fraud/waste/abuse as a “civic duty” (Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives, 2006), and yet the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process is 
broken (U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 2004), the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) 
is woefully inadequate (Mihm, 2001), and secrecy continues to run rampant (Aftergood, 
2010a). The disclosure of hundreds of thousands of potentially classified documents to 
the organization Wikileaks may be an example of what this contradiction has caused. 
While the majority of the U.S. Government and much of the news media had 
immediately condemned the website, describing the disclosure as treasonous and calling 
for the termination of the site itself and prosecution of its founder, Julian Assange; the 
fact remains that the situation has changed. The existence of Wikileaks as an organization 
is irrelevant now, and their most significant contribution is not the release of 1.2 million 
potentially classified documents. Rather, the most significant impact of Wikileaks is their 
successful demonstration and validation of the ‘Wikileaks model.’ Wikileaks has 
demonstrated the power of the internet using web technologies to provide protections 
through anonymity, while giving individuals access to a worldwide audience. The current 
troubles faced by the organization may or may not portend the end of Wikileaks as an 
organization; however, it does provide a glimpse into the future of whistleblowing. 
Building upon the apparent success of the Wikileaks model, the Wall Street Journal and 
Al-Jazeera have both implemented “anonymous” whistleblower submission sites. This 
new paradigm for communications, as enabled by the innovative uses of the Internet and 
social media, provides both opportunities and areas for concern regarding government 
transparency. It is time for a significant change in thinking regarding how the U.S. 
Government handles government whistleblowers.  
Whistleblowing serves as a critical check and balance system to government 
bureaucracy, helping to circumvent administrative roadblocks and to provide a 
mechanism through which homeland security can monitor and increase efficiency in its 
operations. Two former federal agents have even made the case that 9/11 could have been 




warnings and prevented the sharing of key intelligence (Rowley, 2010). Even the 9/11 
Commission concluded that had the information about Moussaouui’s arrest been made 
public, the 9/11 plot may have been postponed (National Commision On Terrorist 
Attacks Upon The United States, 2004).  
Homeland security deals with information that can be of a sensitive or secret 
nature, the unauthorized disclosure of which can cause damage to both homeland security 
efforts and national security. Maintaining the balance between secrecy and transparency 
is a difficult proposition; however, current government efforts, particularly its handling of 
whistleblowers, places that balance in jeopardy. The government has taken steps to 
address some of these problems by releasing new executive orders (E.O.) on classified 
information (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2009), and new policies 
addressing some of the issues associated with FOIA (O’Keefe, 2009). The government 
has also taken extreme measures to prosecute any whistleblowers who stray outside the 
appropriate submission process (i.e., deemed an unauthorized leak of sensitive/classified 
information) or are not protected by the WPA (Goodman, 2007)). The government’s 
position on whistleblowers is further confused by the recent anonymous hold placed on 
the passage of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (a measure designed to fix 
the issues with the WPA) in Congress, despite its bi-partisan support (S. Devine, 2010). 
Instead of acknowledging that current policy on whistleblowers is broken, the 
government’s current course of action decreases the likelihood important 
fraud/waste/abuse information will be received from whistleblowers, while possibly 
influencing their decision and encouraging them to bypass authorized channels and 
instead utilize the Internet to protect themselves from identification and retaliation. 
Despite widespread agreement that whistleblowers play an important role in 
government, current U.S. policies governing whistleblowers and their legal rights are 
widely accepted as inadequate, incomplete, and confusing. No fewer than fifteen separate 
laws provide some guidance on the authorized conduct for and the protection of 
whistleblowers. Worse still, even fewer protections exist for employees of “national 




currently covered by the most significant legislation to date, the Whistleblower Protection 
Act. Despite repeated attempts by Congress to revise legislation and increase support of 
whistleblowers, the increase in unauthorized disclosures continues. The current lack of 
public trust in government, and the existence of alternative avenues for disclosure that 
provide greater protections than those currently offered by the U.S. Government, serve to 
exacerbate the problem.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What policy model and associated technological process could the U.S. DHS 
implement that will encourage whistleblowers to submit information through authorized 
channels as opposed to leaking information to unauthorized parties? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
This research is designed to identify a near-term implementable solution for the 
federal members of the homeland security enterprise to facilitate and increase authorized 
whistleblowing by providing whistleblower protections while simultaneously protecting 
sensitive information. While the primary consumer of this information will be the U.S. 
DHS and its partners, this solution will have broader applicability for other federal 
government entities, and state and local organizations as well. The policy, particularly its 
technological components, may have applications beyond whistleblowers as it could 
potentially be useful as an anonymous tip line for the public, encouraging participation in 
the national “See Something/Say Something” campaign. As is common with Web 2.0, 
the true value of technology only becomes apparent through its innovative application 
and use. 
D. METHOD 
To answer the research question, the researcher will employ a hybrid 
methodology including both conceptual modeling and policy analysis. This process 





The development of a conceptual model, which identifies and dissects the pieces, 
parts, and components of the whistleblowing environment to include applicable policies, 
laws, motivations, requirements, and intentions of all parties involved. This step will 
allow identification of these elements and determine findings and conclusions associated 
with each element. 
The conduct of a technology evaluation, which defines the vulnerabilities of 
potential technological solutions. Clearly defining the vulnerabilities of information 
sharing systems (e.g., phone, email, web) will allow the best suited technology 
component(s) for the recommended policy to be identified. 
The development of a recommended course of action (policy model) through a 
policy analysis based on the findings and conclusions identified by the conceptual model 
and the vulnerabilities identified through the technology evaluation. The policies will 
then be assessed against identified evaluation criteria.  
E. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Whistleblowing serves as a check/balance system to the government bureaucracy, 
helping to bypass administrative roadblocks and to provide a mechanism through which 
homeland security can monitor and increase efficiency in its operations. However, 
homeland security also deals with information that can be of a sensitive or secret nature, 
the unauthorized disclosure of which can cause damage to both homeland security efforts 
and national security. The current process for the authorized submission of 
whistleblowing information is broken, with current whistleblower policies providing 
protections only after reprisals or retaliation have occurred. The technological capability 
to provide whistleblowers protections through anonymity currently exists, and has been 
demonstrated to be effective. The concept of ‘Responsible Disclosure’ in the information 
security world is an excellent example of how critical vulnerability disclosures can be, 
and could serve as a model for a potential solution. By leveraging those technologies and 
creating an authorized process through which homeland security employees can submit 




whistleblowers reporting issues in the first place, and reduce the number of leaks to 
unauthorized recipients (media/stateless news organizations). While technological and 
policy solutions exist that can be applied to this problem by the government, the reality is 
any government solution is likely to be ineffective without addressing the issue of trust in 









A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the body of knowledge on how the U.S. 
Government might leverage Internet technologies in balancing secrecy and transparency. 
The literature cites studies and previous works going back as far as the 1960s; yet much 
has happened over the last decade to shape the debate about secrecy/transparency in 
government affairs radically. Between the relatively recent adoption of the Internet into 
mainstream life and the renewed security concerns associated with the ‘War on 
Terrorism,’ the relevant literature identified in this thesis was primarily published after 
2001. The sources have been derived from academic journals, mainstream media, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and government reports, and are divided into three 
categories. 
• E-Government Initiatives  
• Internet Anonymity 
• Government Secrecy and Whistleblowers 
The approach each individual researcher takes varies greatly; however, their 
arguments are for the most part, mutually confirmatory. The one area with the largest 
disparity of conclusions is in the area of internet anonymity, while the conclusions on E-
Government initiatives and government secrecy and whistleblowers are largely uniform. 
A few areas lack research and study, and those areas are identified as follows. It is 
significant to note that in a comparison of the recommendations identified in government 
reports, academic journals, and NGO reports, little discernible disagreement occurs.  
1. E-Government Initiatives 
E-Government has been defined as “the delivery of [government] information and 
services online via the Internet or other digitals means…and may include opportunities 
for online political participation” (Tolbert, 2006). The literature, which evaluates E-
Government initiatives, has generally concluded the following: our nation’s efforts, 




Government initiatives are designed to improve public confidence in government, and 
Web 2.0 has demonstrated particular use for government to both provide and receive 
information from the public.  
While few agreed upon definitions of public trust exist, it is generally accepted 
across the literature that public trust and confidence play a key role in U.S. activities, and 
that it has declined significantly during the past decade (Welch, 2003; Moon, 2003; 
Tolbert, 2006; Banisar, 2007). Government reports have consistently recommended 
increased public engagement. The U.S. DHS in particular has increased its effort to 
include the public in the homeland security enterprise, specifically identifying the actions 
the public can take in the department’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Report. “From 
suspicious activity reporting and contributing to the deterrence of terrorist activities, to 
leveraging public preparedness to empower communities, help minimize fear, and 
diminish the effectiveness of terrorist tactics, the public plays a key role in homeland 
security efforts” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010).  
The majority of the literature on E-Government initiatives describes their 
potential benefits in terms of positive gain in public confidence. By exploring case 
studies, scholars have evaluated the public response to E-Government initiatives, cost 
savings, and long term potential of these efforts to improve government efficiency and 
response time (West, 2004). Overall, agreement exists that E-Government initiatives 
show promise in providing significant benefits in each of those categories. Some 
concerns have arisen that efficiency gains with E-Government will beget a decline in 
quality, creating a “screen bureaucracy” that will actually increase distance between the 
public and the government. Also discussed is the point that while E-Government does 
provide marked improvements, it is not a catchall solution (Parent, 2005). However, it is 
generally accepted that the positives outweigh the negatives.  
A particularly hot topic of late in terms of E-Government is the use of social 
media or Web 2.0 technologies to support both singular and two-way communication. A 
2008 study found that despite the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and the 




of understanding by leadership still existed as to the significant role that social media 
plays in communications (Guth, 2008). Since 2009, at least three theses on Web 2.0 and 
its use in government were written at the Naval Postgraduate School alone. These theses 
argue that social media provides an avenue for increased speed and efficiency in 
communications (Polania, 2010), improved information sharing (Bennington, 2010), and 
an increased ability to inform the leadership’s decision-making process (Van Leuven, 
2009).  
2. Internet Anonymity 
The literature on E-Government has not specifically explored the issue of 
anonymity. Significant research has been conducted on the topics of anonymity, privacy, 
and the security of information on the Internet, beginning with well-known cryptography 
expert David Chaum’s 1981 paper entitled “Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return 
Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms.” Anonymity is often discussed as a founding 
principle of the Internet, an explicit right, and the cornerstone of Internet freedom 
(Diamond, 2010). Three distinct positions on Internet anonymity have been identified and 
defined by Ya-Ching Lee of the Institute of Communications Management at National 
Sun Yat-Sen University in Taiwan, as the Libertarian Model, the Private Enterprise 
Model, and the Statis Model. Simply put, the Libertarian model favors anonymity for 
individuals, the Private Enterprise model looks at limiting anonymity so companies can 
gather profiles on their customer base, and the Statis model reflects government’s desire 
to limit anonymity due to security concerns (Lee, 2006). For the purposes of this review, 
the Private Enterprise model was not considered as the concerns of private industry are 
not critical in the security vs. transparency debate. 
The pro-Libertarian model literature states that anonymity provides individuals 
freedom of expression and protection from government/corporate surveillance. 
Specifically, the Internet has provided an opportunity for people to fight back against 
oppressive regimes and experience freedom without the fear of retaliation (Diamond, 
2010). Libertarians argue that the Internet is self-regulating, and applying Statis model 




Libertarian model and supporters of the Statis model (not necessarily the same thing) 
argue that anonymity removes accountability, provides an opportunity for terrorists and 
criminals to act without consequence, and provides an open forum for racism and hatred 
(Davenport, 2002; Morrison, 2005). This conflict has equal support on both sides, and 
mirrors the issues associated with the balance of secrecy and transparency. David Sify, 
the founder of Technorati, illustrates the issue “Taking away anonymity would have a 
chilling effect on the Web. We’d lose important release valves like whistle-blowing… 
[although] accountability brings civility” (Barret, 2007). 
While this debate remains primarily at a stalemate, a couple of authors propose 
pseudonymity as a middle ground. Instead of having an unlimited number of identities 
(associated with anonymity), they suggest having a limited number of alternate identities 
with which individuals can surf the web with possible, but limited, traceability associated 
with their pseudonyms (Zarsky, 2004). Ultimately, whether anonymity, pseudonymity, or 
strict identification is the answer, more research needs to be done. Specifically, for the 
purposes of E-Government, identifying how to validate information received through 
social media is another area, which lacks exploratory research and solutions.  
3. Government Secrecy and Whistleblowers 
A significant amount of literature discusses whistleblowers and their role in the 
government secrecy/transparency debate. The discussion has been reinvigorated by 
“cablegate,” the release of hundreds of thousands of classified Department of State cables 
to the website Wikileaks (Rosenweig, 2010). While the debate over the role of media and 
the Internet in whistleblowing activities is very active, widespread agreement exists 
among scholars and the government regarding the problem of over-classification and the 
role of whistleblowers in providing transparency in government affairs. 
The U.S. Government has repeatedly and openly acknowledged the problem of 
over-classification. In a statement to the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on 
Government Reform, Director of the Information Security Oversight Office J. William 




information (T. Devine, 2011).” At his confirmation hearing, Director of National 
Intelligence James R. Clapper stated, “We do over-classify. We can be a lot more liberal, 
I think, about declassifying, and we should be (Aftergood, 2010a).” Even President 
Barack Obama publicly acknowledged, “effective measures to address the problem of 
over-classification” (Aftergood, 2010a) are needed. Over-classification leads to a 
degradation in U.S. ability to engage in homeland security efforts effectively by reducing 
the flow of critical information across agencies and levels of government (National 
Commision On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, 2004). 
Speculation has arisen as to the costs and consequences associated with over-
classification; however, there have not been many definitive answers identified through 
studies. Some authors argue that excessive government secrecy and over-classification 
has reduced government accountability by obstructing the public’s ability to seek 
disclosure of government-held information (The Constitution Project’s Liberty and 
Security Committee, 2009). The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report) found that existing trends of 
over-classification and secrecy deprived intelligence and law enforcement of a potent 
weapon against terrorism: an alert and well-informed American public (National 
Commision On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, 2004). In FY2009, alone, the 
costs associated with government security classification were approximately $8.8 billion 
dollars, not including intelligence agencies’ expenditures (Kosar, 2010). More research 
needs to be done to demonstrate the real costs and benefits, both financial and social, of 
addressing the over-classification problem. Still, current policy and legal solutions to the 
over-classification problem are limited and unimaginative for providing for a significant 
role for whistleblowers to play. 
Clay Shirky, an author and expert on Internet technologies and their social impact, 
writes,  
For many of our most important social systems, we resolve clashing 
principles by providing an escape valve, in the form of a set of actors who 
are less rule-bound than the rest of the system. The most famous and 




laws and evidence, simply not return the verdict a judge would have 
returned. So with secrecy. Though I am not a lawyer, the Supreme Court’s 
1971 ruling seems to say that there is no law-like way to balance the 
State’s need for secrets with the threats secrets pose to democracies. 
(Shirky, 2010) 
In the context described above, Shirky is not alone in the idea of whistleblowers 
as the “non-law like way” to address secrecy; in fact, both the academic and government 
communities support the actions of whistleblowers as necessary to report fraud, waste 
and abuse in government (Verschoor, 2010; Vandekerckhove, 2010; Smith, 2010; Fisher, 
2005). Congress has gone as far to say, “All Federal employees are ethically bound to 
expose violations of law, corruption, waste, and substantial danger to public health or 
safety” (Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 2006). 
In addition to the widespread agreement of the importance of whistleblowers, 
general acknowledgement also exists that whistleblowers face significant risks of 
retaliation and reprisal (Goodman, 2007; Project on Government Oversight, 2005; S. 
Devine, 2010), and that current whistleblower protections are inadequate (U.S. Office of 
Special Counsel, 2004; Mihm, 2001; U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 2010; 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 2006). Many authors have 
provided policy recommendations to address retaliation; however, most of the 
recommendations are focused on managing the consequences after retaliation occurs. 
Very little research discusses the possibility of addressing the problem from a prevention 
standpoint. Two current government efforts are happening to leverage technology and 
anonymity to promote whistleblower activities, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO)’s FRAUDNET (Government Accountability Office, 2009) and the Department of 
Defense’s ‘Defense Hotline’ (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2007). An 
opportunity exists to study the lessons learned from these two government programs, and 
examine the possibility of addressing the issues of whistleblower retaliation and reprisal 





The topics of E-Government, Internet anonymity, and whistleblowers have each 
individually been broadly covered by the current field of research. However, a detailed 
evaluation or discussion of the interrelationships between these concepts has not 
occurred. For example, how to verify the accuracy of the information being provided by 
the public, if the submission is anonymous? This thesis explores those relationships for 
the purposes of identifying realistic solutions in an attempt to answer what may be an 
unanswerable question—How to balance secrecy and transparency?  
This debate has been ongoing at the center of American politics back to the days 
of this country’s birth. As this republic was being established, the founding fathers were 
contemplating the questions regarding the role of secrecy in government affairs, and the 
extent to which political decisions and government actions should be transparent to the 
public. Much has changed over the last 200 years, and those changes have seen the U.S. 
Government’s policies on secrecy and transparency shift between one end of the 
spectrum to the other. The shift is often the result of changes to the political, economic, 
and technological landscapes impacting this country, but a definitive answer to the 
underlying questions has yet to appear. How to decide what the public needs to know, 
and what to keep confidential? How to balance government accountability with national 
security interests? In the absence of agreement among government leaders and sufficient 
government mechanisms to ensure transparency to the public, traditional media 
organizations have long played a role as an external “watchdog” for government 
activities. The idea that traditional media organizations today are the same “free press” 
described by Jefferson is no longer accurate. The government’s ability to influence and 
direct the media has increased substantially over the past few decades, and with economic 
trouble affecting traditional media organizations’ ability to pursue investigative 
journalism, transparency has continued to decline, which is surprising considering the 
dramatic change in the information-sharing environment over the last decade. New 
technology, the rapid evolution of the Internet, and innovations in social media have 
provided the ability to gather and share information at an unprecedented level, and yet the 




The government’s failure to adapt to the new environment and adequately address 
the over-classification problem, as well as the traditional media’s inability to serve as the 
government watchdog adequately, has created a public backlash. The recent disclosure of 
thousands of potentially classified documents by the website Wikileaks is an example of 
what is likely to be a growing trend. While the U.S. Government and much of the news 
media have immediately condemned the website, describing the disclosure as treasonous 
and calling for the termination of the site itself, a dissenting viewpoint does exist. Some 
argue that in the absence of sufficient and reasonable government efforts to provide 
transparency, and with a reduced ability of the news media to perform the ‘watchdog’ 
function, Wikileaks provides a service that bypasses the bureaucracy and provides vital 
information to the public. That instead of treason, Wikileaks is a ‘whistleblower’ website 
and it should be considered a positive tool in the pursuit of government transparency and 
accountability. Each of these positions represents the polar ends of the 
secrecy/transparency spectrum, extreme approaches that do not acknowledge the need for 
a balanced answer. To identify solutions that achieve that balance, it is critical to 
understand the principle elements at play, first and foremost: whistleblowing. 
B. PERCEPTION OF WHISTLEBLOWING 
Through a review of the considerable amount of research that has been focused on 
government whistleblowers, it is clear that the majority of employees who witness acts of 
wrongdoing choose not to report it. Despite the inaction of the overwhelming majority, 
there are those who do step forward and act, regardless of the potential consequences 
they face. What constitutes a whistleblower, what are the characteristics that set these 
individuals apart, and what psychological factors influence their decisions? This section 
will define whistleblowers, explore both the dispositional and situational factors that 
affect them, and ultimately, propose some key issues that must be addressed to support 
increased whistleblowing among homeland security employees. 
Historically, significant support for whistleblowers has occurred within Congress 
and the public. Popular culture has seen the success of films, such as Serpico (1973), The 




courageous champions of truth, standing alone in an environment of rampant corruption. 
Congress has also traditionally been pro-whistleblower, repeatedly passing and revising 
laws in an attempt to protect and even encourage whistleblowers to come forward. In her 
2003 book, Whistleblowing: When it Works- and Why, Roberta Ann Johnson even goes 
as far to claim, “It is no surprise that regardless of party or ideology, Congress always 
passes whistleblower protective legislation unanimously” (Johnson, 2003). 
Unfortunately, that no longer holds true, definitely for Congress and possibly for the 
public at large. This change does not reflect increased support for corruption and 
wrongdoing, rather it stems from uncertainty surrounding the definition of 
whistleblowers and their actions. As stated previously, no generally accepted definition 
for whistleblowing exists; as such, it has come to mean different things to different 
people (Miethe, 1999). Significant cultural pressures have always existed not to break 
rank, with terms, such as ‘snitch’ and ‘rat,’ prominently used to describe people who 
speak out against their organization/group. Even among kids, ‘tattle-tale’ is used to label 
those who inform authority figures (teachers/parents) of misdeeds or wrongdoing. 
Current opponents of whistleblowers even go as far as using terms, such as ‘traitors’ to 
label them and their actions, seeking to invoke serious charges against them, including 
but not limited, to espionage and damaging national security. The environment created by 
these factors has allowed the definition of whistleblowing to be usurped and applied (by 
both extreme secrecy advocates and extreme transparency advocates) to people whose 
actions are not whistleblowing, but to those who, in fact, may have jeopardized national 
security. The release of hundreds of thousands of diplomatic cables and documents from 
both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to ‘Wikileaks’ is an example of such a disclosure. 
The indiscriminant release of these documents, with no clear objective, to an organization 
that exercises the ability to shape the messages (alter the truth), is not whistleblowing. 
Debates have occurred as to the actual damage to national security caused by those 
releases; however, the presence of information that serves the ‘public interest’ is also 
unclear. Classifying this action as whistleblowing, which has been promoted by both 
sides of the transparency/secrecy debate, only serves to destabilize support for legitimate 




Wikileaks disclosures on the perception of whistleblowers in Congress is exemplified by 
its inability to pass the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), specifically 
the anonymous hold placed on the bill in 2010 (Devine, 2011).  
Two ways exist to address the perception issue: redefining whistleblowing, or 
replacing the terms whistleblower and whistleblowing with alternatives that do not carry 
historical baggage/controversy. This thesis focuses on the former—redefining 
whistleblowing and clarifying the key components of the definition. Alternatives to the 
term whistleblower exist, including “lamp-lighter,” which if propagated, could help to 
address the negative connotations associated with whistleblowing, and should be 
considered for future use. 
I have always preferred the term “lamp lighter” to whistleblower. We can 
holler and shout but it’s the lamplight that shines on corruption, injustice, 
ineptitude and abuse of power. We reveal villains as they try to scurry into 
the woodwork in hiding. We’re often told: ‘don’t make so much noise’ but 
we can reply, ‘you’ll soon hear noise enough before long’.  
- Frank Serpico (Project on Government Oversight, 2002) 
C. DEFINING WHISTLEBLOWING 
While no single definition exists, a few definitions are commonly used to describe 
whistleblowing. Ralph Nader, in 1972, used one of the earliest definitions, and states, 
“whistleblowing is an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest 
overrides the interest of the organization he serves, blows the whistle that the 
organization is in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful activity” (Whistleblowing CEE 
Project, n.d.). Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, in 1982, proposed the most commonly 
referenced definition out of the academic field of whistleblowing research, which states 
whistleblowing, is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action” (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008). 
Finally, the U.S. Government defines a whistleblower as someone who “discloses 




gross mismanagement; a gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; a substantial and 
specific danger to public health; and/or a substantial and specific danger to public safety” 
(U.S. Office of Special Councel, 2010). While these three definitions have similarities, 
they each possess a distinct and yet critical element required for a complete definition of 
whistleblowing.  
The role of whistleblowing in government, specifically its legitimacy and process, 
are often debated in terms of the whistleblower’s motivations, the content/significance of 
the whistleblower’s claims, and to whom the report is made. Not every act involving the 
disclosure of information should be considered whistleblowing (Whistleblowing CEE 
Project, n.d.); a clear definition of whistleblowing is required to delineate whistleblowing 
from other activities. For example, informants “are often involved in some sort of 
unethical affairs, and use disclosure for clarifying their own role, or reducing their 
liability” (Whistleblowing CEE Project, n.d.). This definition of informant could be 
further expanded to include anyone whose motivation for disclosure is self-serving in 
nature (profit, notoriety, etc.). To distinguish whistleblowers from other categories of 
behavior (e.g., informants, issue selling, taking charge, and inactive observers (Miceli, 
Near, & Dworkin, 2008), any definition of whistleblowing should include the three 
distinct key elements from the definitions above: “reasonably believes,” “public interest,” 
and “effect action.” It is important to highlight that it may not be possible to determine 
the true motivations of employees who expose wrongdoing. Similar to the philosophical 
debate on the existence of altruism, it is impossible to prove. In all likelihood, 
whistleblowers’ intent probably includes a mix of selfish and selfless motivations 
(Johnson, 2003). However, by including the phrase “acting in the public interest,” much 
needed emphasis on the selfless part of intent is provided. Further, to prevent a debate 
over the significance/size of wrongdoing, which may impact the protections afforded the 
employee filing the claim, the definition of whistleblowing should not include subjective 
terms, such as “gross,” “substantial,” or “specific.” The extent of the wrongdoing can be 
determined after the submission is made, and the purpose of the definition should be to 
encourage employees to come forward. A more complete definition of whistleblowing 




The voluntary disclosure by any man or woman acting in the public 
interest who reasonably believes that a violation of any law, rule, or 
regulation; mismanagement; a waste of funds; an abuse of authority; a 
danger to public health; and/or a danger to public safety has occurred and 
reports that information to persons or organizations that may be able to 
effect action. 
For the purposes of supporting the process presented in this thesis, it is important 
to expound on the “persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” section of 
the definition. 
In the computer security world, two types of vulnerability disclosures exist, full 
disclosure and responsible disclosure. Full disclosure can be defined as the disclosure of 
system vulnerabilities to the public with the intent of using public exposure to prompt 
rapid modification/adaptation to secure the vulnerability. Responsible disclosure can be 
defined as the disclosure of system vulnerabilities to the responsible party for a 
predetermined amount of time, to allow for modification/adaptation to secure the 
vulnerability prior to full disclosure. For a responsible disclosure policy to be successful, 
the possibility of full disclosure must exist. Organizations are more likely to take prompt 
action to address security vulnerabilities if they risk being exploited or losing face to the 
public, which is also applicable to government organizations and private sector critical 
infrastructure organizations as well.  
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have 
acted; the indifference of those who should have known better; the silence 
of the voice of justice when it mattered most; that has made it possible for 
evil to triumph 
- Haile Selassie, former emperor of Ethiopia. (Zimbardo, 2007) 
Utilizing the proposed definition to define whistleblowing, and excluding those 
who report misdeed primarily (or solely) for personal gain, what drives whistleblowers to 
act? Significant research has occurred into the dispositional characteristics of 
whistleblowers in an attempt to determine if particular types of people exist who are more 




this question, including the oft promoted “whistleblowers are principled individuals with 
strong moral convictions and ethical employees, which has been prominent in the 
academic community” (Miethe, 1999). Many dispositional factors could potentially affect 
whistleblowers, including educational level, age, work experience, gender, marital status, 
and religious beliefs. Based on these factors, additional assumptions have been made that 
suggest that whistleblowers are more likely to be men who are better educated, have 
strong belief systems (religious), are more likely than others to endorse universal 
standards, believe in making sacrifices for the greater good, feel that people have a 
responsibility to prevent harm to others, and think they are persons of worth (Miethe, 
1999). Regarding age and work experience, a number of conflicting assumptions have 
been drawn, with no clear and logical conclusion identified. Despite these assumptions, 
research conducted by Miethe on the dispositional traits of whistleblowers, to include 
personality and socio-demographic factors, indicates the lack of a strong difference 
between whistleblowers and other employees (Miethe, 1999). This research supports the 
idea that no specific whistleblower personality really exists, and instead, whistleblowers 
are more likely to act based on situational factors.  
In The Lucifer Effect, Dr. Philip Zimbardo explores the power of situational 
factors, largely in the context of his Stanford Prison Experiment. In his chapter on social 
dynamics, Zimbardo explores the factors that impact situational power, and the studies 
that have demonstrated it. Concluding his chapter, Zimbardo cites a meta-analysis of over 
100 years of social psychological research, including 25,000 studies and 8 million people, 
which demonstrates the robust and reliable impact of social situational forces (Zimbardo, 
2007). Many of these situational forces affect a person’s decision as to whether to come 
forward as a whistleblower, and understanding those forces provide a greater opportunity 
to create an environment more conducive to whistleblowing. 
It is impossible to discuss whistleblowing without addressing consequences. The 
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) identifies the effect whistleblowing will 
have on an individual’s job, career and future as one of the most significant reasons why 




that the consequences of whistleblowing must be carefully weighed prior to acting, as 
they can cause severe damage to programs, agencies, and the people involved (Johnson, 
2003). In her 1981 essay, “Blowing the Whistle,” Bok proposes a whistleblower checklist 
designed to facilitate the evaluation of three primary issues by the whistleblower—
dissent, loyalty, and accusation. While the checklist is a good start to the discussion, it is 
clearly presented in terms of potential consequences to the organization. It does not 
acknowledge or account for the significant risks faced by the whistleblowers themselves. 
In “Whistleblowing At Work,” Miethe posits that “about half of all whistleblowers are 
expected to experience severe retaliation by management for their disclosures” (Miethe, 
1999). Based on the realities faced by whistleblowers, specifically, the likely 
consequences they face (retaliation by harassment, reassignment, poor performance 
reviews, loss of clearances, and/or loss of the job), a risk category should be added to 
Bok’s whistleblower checklist. The checklist proposed in The Art of Anonymous Activism 
focuses almost entirely on the whistleblower, and could serve to provide balance to Bok’s 
whistleblower checklist.  
Whistleblowing is often debated in terms of loyalty, specifically, weighing loyalty 
to the organization against loyalty to the public interest/moral principles. The conflict 
between these two forces is often at the center of the internal debate of employees 
deciding whether or not to come forward. Bok describes this dichotomy as “loyalty to the 
agency and to colleagues comes to be pitted against loyalty to the public interest” 
(Johnson, 2003). In 1980, Congress passed a Code of Ethics for Government Service, 
which required persons in government service to “put loyalty to the highest moral 
principles above loyalty to persons, party, or government department” (U.S. Government, 
1980). However, the reality is that this is not a black and white issue, with many factors 
weighing into the debate. The type and severity of misconduct observed, the frequency of 
the misconduct, and the relationship between the potential whistleblower and the violator 
all serve to influence the decision to come forward. For some, loyalties to groups trump 
loyalties to moral principles. Following his acceptance of the Nobel Prize, Albert Camus 





For others, the loyalty to principle and their commitment to preventing harm outweighed 
all of the other factors. C. Fred Alford calls this the whistleblower’s “choiceless choice” 
(Uys, 2011).  
Two primary types of situational influences affect whistleblowers, group 
influence and the influence of authority. Zimbardo discusses both in The Lucifer Effect, 
describing group influence as “often indirect, simply modeling the normative behavior 
the group wants us to imitate and practice,” while authority influence is “more often 
direct and without subtlety” (Zimbardo, 2007). Both can be seen as having significant 
influence over whistleblowers, creating an environment, which has the potential to 
encourage whistleblowing, although more often than not serves to discourage 
whistleblowing. Zimbardo calls this the “institutionalized evil of inaction” (Zimbardo, 
2007). Although indirect and often more subtle, group influence is significant and can 
cause people to do things they might not ordinarily do on their own (Zimbardo, 2007). 
Group influence plays off human nature and what C. S. Lewis calls “the terror of being 
left outside” (Zimbardo, 2007), combining external forces, such as peer pressure with the 
internal desire to be part of the “in group.” In both Muzafer Sherif’s initial studies on 
conformity, and Solomon Asch’s follow up studies, the results demonstrated that more 
often than not, people will give up their independent positions and follow a group 
mentality, even when they know the group is wrong (Zimbardo, 2007). The desire to be 
part of the group and not ‘rock the boat’ overwhelmed their independence, as the 
psychological costs associated with autonomy were too great.  
Stanley Milgram, who built upon the foundations of Asch’s studies and shifted 
the focus to determine how far someone would go under orders, has explored the extent 
to which authority figures have influence over people. In his first experiment, Milgram 
demonstrated how 65% of people would follow orders completely, despite expert 
predictions of less than 1% compliance (Zimbardo, 2007). Over the course of a year, 
Milgram conducted 19 different experiments in which he varied social psychological 
factors and measured their influence over his subjects. His data demonstrate it is possible 




which almost anyone could be either totally obedient or resistant to authority pressures 
(Zimbardo, 2007). The obedience effect demonstrated through these results have been 
replicated by a number of subsequent studies, further demonstrating the power influence 
that authority figures possess over subordinates. 
Group influence and authority influence are not only able to cause action, but they 
are also able to create an environment conducive to inaction, which can sometimes be 
even more damaging. Zimbardo describes this influence as the “Institutionalized Evil of 
Inaction,” stating that “in situations where evil is being practiced…there are often 
observers of the ongoing activities or people who know what is going on and do not 
intervene to help or challenge the evil and thereby enable evil to persist by their inaction” 
(Zimbardo, 2007). Bystander apathy, as demonstrated by the Kitty Genovese Case, is an 
unfortunate example of this. In 1964, 38 people in Queens, New York watched and did 
nothing as Kitty Genovese was killed outside her apartment (Johnson, 2003). While more 
recent analysis of the case casts some doubt on how many people actually saw the murder 
taking place, no question exists that many people heard the screams and still did not act 
(Zimbardo, 2007). Two factors help explain the lack of action by the witnesses: the need 
for interpretation created by ambiguity, and the fact that if others appear unconcerned, the 
less likely any one person will react (Johnson, 2003). These factors are also prominent in 
the whistleblowing environment, where ambiguity and the pressure not to break rank 
often combine and influence people away from whistleblowing. A former government 
employee once stated, “being a Democrat or Republican is just a party affiliation. ‘Don’t 
Make Waves’ is a religion” (Johnson, 2003). 
[W]e must learn that passively to accept an unjust system is to cooperate 
with that system, and thereby become a participant in its evil  
– Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Zimbardo, 2007) 
Just as situational forces can push both action and inaction, so too can they 
promote heroism, as well as evil. Commenting on the ‘banality of heroism,’ Zimbardo 
remarks that the perpetrators of evil and heroism alike are just common, ordinary people; 




conditions (evil/heroism) emerge in particular situations and at particular times when 
situational forces come together to influence individuals to action (or inaction) 
(Zimbardo, 2007). The research by Miethe into a “whistleblowing personality” confirms 
that Dr. Zimbardo’s statement rings true for whistleblowing as well. Whistleblowing is 
celebrated in The Lucifer Effect as a subtype of ‘social heroism,’ specifically defined as 
“individuals who are aware of illegal or unethical activities in an organization who report 
the activity without expectation of reward” and risk “jeopardizing carefully groomed 
careers, professional ostracism, loss of social status, financial losses, loss of credibility, 
and physical reprisal” (Zimbardo, 2007). 
Despite the current environment being dominated by overwhelming pressure to 
conform and organizational loyalty prioritized and reinforced by authority figures, steps 
can be taken to modify the environment to be more conducive to whistleblowing. 
Zimbardo, discussing the possibility of a ‘Reverse-Milgram Altruism Effect,’ provides a 
10-step process to resist unwanted influences (Zimbardo, 2007). Many of the 10 steps he 
proposes are applicable to the whistleblowing environment and should be promoted 
vigorously by homeland security leadership, which includes promoting (and exhibiting) 
accountability and personal responsibility, critical thinking, individuality and vigilance. 
The fourth of Dr. Zimbardo’s 10 steps is “I will assert my unique identity,” and it 
emphasizes that “anonymity and secrecy conceal wrongdoing [and] undermine the human 
connection” (Zimbardo, 2007), which is one area of focus where Zimbardo’s conclusions 
are contrary to that factor’s role in the whistleblowing environment. Significant research 
has been conducted into how deindividuation and anonymity lead to increased aggression 
and destructiveness. “Deindividuation creates a unique psychological state in which 
behavior comes under the control of immediate situational demands and biological, 
hormonal urges. Action replaces thought” (Zimbardo, 2007), which has also been 
researched in the context of internet interactions, specifically dubbed the ‘Online 
Disinhibition Effect’ (Suler, 2004). This theory attributes six factors: dissociative 
anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjections, dissociative imagination, 
and minimization of authority, which combine to facilitate people saying and doing 




In his article on Online Disinhibtion, John Suler discusses two types of disinhibition, 
benign and toxic. Toxic disinhibition is consistent with Zimbardo’s assessment of 
deindividuation and anonymity contributing to “rude language, harsh criticisms, anger, 
hatred, and even threats” (Suler, 2004). However, the research on whistleblowing 
suggests that not only can anonymity promote ‘benign disinhibition’ (the act of showing 
unusual kindness or generosity to others) (Suler, 2004), but in situations in which group 
and/or authority pressure occurs to NOT stand out or ‘make waves,’ anonymity can 
actually promote breaking rank and whistleblowing (Miethe, 1999)—defined by 
Zimbardo as a heroic act. By affording the availability of increased anonymity in 
authorized whistleblower submission processes, it is likely that the amount of 
whistleblowing overall would increase. 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF WHISTLEBLOWING 
Modern society, as a whole, accepts and understands that misdeeds and 
wrongdoing occur, and implements measures to identify and correct those actions. 
Through the establishment of Inspectors General (IG), GAO and Internal Affairs in the 
public sector, and both internal and external auditing bodies in the private sector, 
organizations conduct self-evaluations and submit to outside oversight. Whistleblowing is 
an important part of this process, as whistleblowers are in a unique position to observe 
misconduct in their organizations (Miethe, 1999). Multiple studies have been conducted 
on fraud detection, and not only have the results of these studies supported the role of 
whistleblowers in detecting fraud, they even go as far to identify whistleblowers as the 
“single most effective source of information in both detecting and rooting out corporate 
criminal activity” (Kohn, 2011). PricewaterhouseCoopers conducted a study in 2007 that 
identified that whistleblowers uncovered 43% of corporate fraud (National 
Whistleblowers Center, 2010), while auditors uncovered 19%, and law enforcement 3% 
(Kohn, 2011). A 2010 study by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners on Global 
Fraud concluded, “tips were by far the most common detection method. In our study, 
catching nearly three times as many frauds as any other form of detection…not 




Whistleblowing allows organizations to identify issues, which can result in both 
financial savings and reduction of the potential for negative publicity and public 
backlash. Both Department of Defense (DoD) and the GAO have established fraud ‘hot 
lines’ to promote whistleblowing and accountability in government affairs. In 1998, DoD 
estimated that submissions to their IG hotline resulted in an average of $15 million per 
year (Miethe, 1999). In 2011, the Justice Department recovered more than $3 billion 
under the False Claims Act (Gamble, 2011), including the case of a company called 
American Grocers. This company was buying expired food at discounted rates, changing 
the dates on the food, and selling the food to the government at a significant markup. This 
food was to be served to American troops fighting in Iraq. The owner of the company 
was sentenced to 24 months in prison, and the Department of Justice reached a $15 
million settlement with the company (Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). 
Delma Pallares, a whistleblower, initiated the government’s investigation into American 
Grocers (Knight, 2010). Thus, whistleblowers play a critical role in the identification of 
fraud and wrongdoing. Of the $3 billion recovered in 2011 by the Department of Justice, 
$2.8 billion of that amount (93%) was investigated as a result of whistleblowers (Gamble, 
2011). This situation exemplifies Zimbardo’s 10th step, appropriately entitled, “I can 
oppose unjust systems” (Zimbardo, 2007). This mentality, above all, needs to be 
supported in government. The idea that ‘one person can make a difference’ should be 
promoted and reinforced using both authority influence and group influence. The goal 
should be to change the homeland security culture to support speaking out, and 
developing processes, which reduce personal risk to employees. It is only through the 
modification of the situational factors affecting potential whistleblowers that the DHS 








III.  ANALYSIS 
A. CURRENT STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AUTHORIZED 
PROCESSES AND PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLEBLOWING  
1. U.S. Whistleblowing Policies 
Whistleblowing in the United States is a complicated and risky proposition, with 
no fewer than 15 federal laws and upwards of 44 state laws, which address the issue in 
some way. Over the past few years, in particular, public awareness of whistleblowing has 
increased significantly; however, many misconceptions exist regarding the process and 
protections provided to whistleblowers in the United States. As the extent of U.S. law and 
policy on the issue of whistleblowing prevents an all-inclusive, in-depth review, this 
analysis focuses on the primary legislation impacting federal homeland security 
employees.  
As defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (United States Code), it is a prohibited practice 
for the government to engage in reprisal for whistleblowing—generally, a person with 
personnel authority cannot take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to an 
employee or applicant because of a disclosure of information by the employee or 
applicant that he or she reasonably believes evidences a violation of a law, rule or 
regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. The prohibition does not apply, 
however, if the disclosure is barred by law or is specifically required by Executive Order 
(E.O.) to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign 
affairs, except when such a disclosure is made to the Special Counsel, the IG, or a 
comparable agency official (U.S. Office of Special Counsel, n.d.). 
The underlying basis for whistleblower protection is often identified as a 
constitutional right, having been established within the Bill of Rights, specifically, the 1st 
Amendment. Whistleblowing could certainly be considered a principle in practice with 





employees that significantly limit their ability to disclose information in the first place 
(e.g., government secrets/classified information), mandating that they use internal 
administrative processes instead of legal action.  
Significant case law serves to complicate the matter further. Garcetti v. Ceballos1 
(2006) established that the protection under the 1st Amendment is limited when speech is 
part of “official duties” (U.S. Supreme Court, 2006); however, subsequent rulings in 
Posey v Lake Pend2 (2008), Marable v. Mark3 (2007), and Thomas v. City of Blanchard4 
(2008), have been conflicting. Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act provides further support 
to the protections established in the 1st Amendment. However, federal law upholds the 
right of the president to classify information and restrict its dissemination, severely 
impacting the protections provided to homeland security whistleblowers within the 
constitution, which is an important example of how outside factors (e.g., legal rulings, 
agency actions, etc.) can have a significant impact on the interpretation and 
implementation of whistleblowing law.  
Outside of constitutional rights, the primary law, which governs federal 
whistleblowers, is the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and the subsequent WPA. The 
CSRA was established in 1978 and is generally acknowledged as one of the weaker 
whistleblower laws (Kohn, 2011), and, as such, it has seen multiple amendments. The 
                                                 
1 In this 2006 case of a district attorney (Ceballos) who claimed he was retaliated against for criticizing 
the legitimacy of a warrant, the court ruled (in a 5–4 decision) that because his statements were made as a 
public-employee and not as a citizen, he retained no 1st Amendment protection (Duke Law). 
2 This 2008 case heard by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, dealt with a ‘security specialist’ employed 
by a school district (Posey) who expressed concerns to the school district regarding school safety and 
inadequate emergency plans. Posey suffered retaliation, and the district court ruled that his actions did not 
receive 1st Amendment protections per the Garcetti case. In this case, the appeals court overturned the 
district court’s decision (The Recorder, 2008).  
3 In 2007, Ken Marable, a Washington State Ferry engineer, appealed a prior District Court ruling that 
his speaking out against corruption was not protected under the 1st Amendment. As in the Posey case, the 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the District Court’s decision (United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit, 2007).  
4 In this 2008 case heard by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, the court overturned a District Court 
ruling that Ira Thomas (a building code inspector for the City of Blanchard Oklahoma) was not protected 
under the 1st Amendment for reporting suspected illegality per Garcetti (United States Court of Appeals, 




CSRA established the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) to protect whistleblowers from 
retaliation, while the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) was authorized to hear and 
adjudicate reprisal complaints from whistleblowers (Lewis, 2010). Under this process, 
any appeals to the ruling of the MSPB are taken to the Federal Circuit Court. 
Unfortunately, under CSRA, up to 90% of whistleblowers lost appeals within the 
OSC/MSPB process, resulting in a significant decrease of whistleblowing over time 
(Lewis, 2010). To address this problem, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection 
Act in 1989, which took steps to strengthen the OSC as an independent body; allowed for 
whistleblowers to take individual action if the OSC chose not to take their case to the 
MSPB, and eased the burden of proof on the employee to demonstrate that adverse 
treatment was due to whistleblowing (Miethe, 1999). Despite the attempts by Congress to 
address loopholes and shortcomings in the CSRA/WPA, major shortfalls continue to 
hamper legislation because of the interpretation of the laws by the courts and the 
implementation of laws by responsible agencies (OSC, MSPB, etc.). The Senate 
Committee report on the WPA even went so far as to state, “The Committee intends that 
disclosures be encouraged. The OSC [Office of Special Counsel], the [Merit Systems 
Protection] Board, and the courts should not erect barriers to disclosures which will limit 
the necessary flow of information from employees who have knowledge of government 
wrongdoing. For example, it is inappropriate for disclosures to be protected only if they 
are made for certain purposes or to certain employees or only if the employee is the first 
to raise the issue” (U.S. Senate, 2002). Despite what would appear to be clear guidance in 
support of whistleblowers, currently policies do not provide protections to employees 
who report wrongdoing in their chain of command, tell co-workers or those suspected of 
wrongdoing, challenge policies, are dictated, by virtue of their job description to find or 
point out wrongdoing; or are not the first to raise the problem. The impact of these 
loopholes is demonstrated by the fact that since 1999, approximately 94% of 
whistleblowers have lost appeals within the OSC/MSPB process, and whistleblowers 
have won only three cases out of 202 at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals since 




It is important to note that while the CRSA/WPA provides protection, albeit 
limited, to federal employees, a “national security” exemption does exist. As defined by 
the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, 
any employee who works for “the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
any Executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities (United States Code)” is exempted, 
and therefore, not covered by the WPA. While the DHS is not specifically identified in 
the legislation, instances occur when the Transportation Security Administration (a 
component of DHS) is specified as not being covered in the WPA, and clearly other 
components of DHS fall within the realm of ‘intelligence collection.’ Section 463 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that pursuant to the exemptions identified above, 
“nothing in this charter shall be construed as exempting the Department from 
requirements applicable with respect to executive agencies—(1) to provide equal 
employment protection for employees of the department (United States Code).” This 
situation appears to be circular logic, stating that homeland security is not exempt from 
these protections, except when it is exempt from these protections. In an attempt to 
address the issues associated with exempt agencies, Congress established the Intelligence 
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, which served to reinforce its right to 
receive classified information from whistleblowers in the intelligence IC and allows for 
the Office of the IG to investigate whistleblower retaliation. Unfortunately, the ICWPA 
does not provide any protections to whistleblowers; rather it is only focused on 
procedures. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has its own whistleblower 
protection statute, which also identifies the process through which FBI whistleblowers 
can submit information and the organizations responsible for the investigation of 
whistleblower retaliation claims. As discussed above, despite the intent of Congress 
through legislation, the interpretation and implementation of policies falls to individual 
agencies that have consistently demonstrated a lack of support for whistleblowers. 




“concern…that the latest investigation was a sign of the FBI’s apparent haste to launch an 
OPR probe every time an agent speaks publicly about problems within the FBI” 
(Grassley, 2004).  
The aforementioned U.S. policies only account for a fraction of the total federal 
policies in place regarding whistleblowers. A number of laws exist that are designed to 
incentivize whistleblowing, particularly in cases in which the government is being 
overcharged or defrauded. Under the False Claims Act, whistleblowers can receive 
compensation, to include a percentage of the total money returned from the disclosure, as 
a reward. The Frank-Dodd Act and the amended Sarbanes-Oxley Act, provide provisions 
for whistleblowers to receive rewards for reporting fraud in the financial sector. While 
these do not necessarily apply to the homeland security employee, (with the exception of 
the False-Claims Act), Frank-Dodd and Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrate an 
acknowledgement by the government that whistleblowing is important and should not 
only be protected, but rewarded as well.  
2. International Policies for Whistleblowing  
Despite the intent of Congress to support whistleblowing through the 
establishment of legislation, the United States remains behind much of the international 
community in providing the necessary guidance, incentives, and protections required to 
promote authorized whistleblowing. Through a review of international policies on 
whistleblowing, it may be possible to identify best practices that would be beneficial for a 
U.S. solution. The following four countries serve as a representative sample of foreign 
whistleblower policies, and provide useful information on promising practices and 
lessons learned.  
a. United Kingdom 
Whistleblowers in the United Kingdom (UK) are covered primarily under 
a single law, the Public Information Disclosures Act (PIDA) that came into effect July 2, 
1999. PIDA is defined within its preamble as “an Act to protect individuals who make 




action in respect of victimisation and for connected purposes” (Government of the United 
Kingdom, 1998). While some similarities occur with the WPA and U.S. whistleblowing 
policies, PIDA presents a number of interesting and distinctly different approaches to 
whistleblower protections. PIDA provides coverage to all workers across all sectors, 
including temporary agency staff and contractors, home workers, police officers and 
every professional in the National Health Service. No minimum qualifiers exist (such as 
age and time of employment), however, like the U.S. WPA, it does not cover intelligence 
services and the armed forces (Public Concern At Work, n.d.). If protected employees 
suffers retaliation or are victimized as a result of their act, they are eligible to bring a 
claim before an Employment Tribunal, which can award damages (currently uncapped) 
based on the loss suffered, including the potential for additional compensation for 
aggravated damages and injury to feelings (Public Concern At Work, n.d.). Victimization 
can include dismissal, or, “any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by 
his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure” 
(Government of the United Kingdom, 1998). PIDA defines protected whistleblowing 
when 1) a criminal offense has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be 
committed, 2) a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal 
obligation to which he is subject, 3) a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or 
is likely to occur, 4) the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to 
be endangered, 5) the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or 6) 
information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding 
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 
Whistleblowing policies in the UK were developed in an attempt to find 
the balance between the protection and promotion of public interest disclosures and the 
importance of organizational secrecy in free enterprise. The primary concern remains that 
whistleblower protections could be used to cover industrial espionage (Lewis, 2010). To 
achieve a compromise, PIDA establishes a ‘three-tiered’ approach for whistleblowers to 
report information. The first tier addresses what is often defined as ‘internal 
whistleblowing,’ or reporting the observed or suspected wrongdoing within the agency, 




to internal whistleblowers (as long as they meet the required criteria), and allows for 
internal reporting either within or outside of their hierarchy/chain of command. For a 
disclosure to be protected at the first tier, the criterion is that the whistleblower has “a 
reasonable belief the information tends to show that malpractice has occurred, is 
occurring or is likely to occur” (Lewis, 2010). 
The second tier in the UK process allows for disclosures to regulatory 
authorities, including the Financial Services Authority, the Health and Safety Executive 
or the Care Quality Commission (Public Concern At Work, 2010). While this tier is 
traditionally defined as ‘external whistleblowing’ or reporting the observed or suspected 
wrongdoing outside of the agency, this second tier allows external whistleblowing to 
occur in the absence of going to the broader public or society at large. By establishing a 
‘proxy for society’ (Lewis, 2010), whistleblowers are given an alternative avenue to 
report wrongdoing without truly exposing those concerns to the broader public, as is the 
case with traditional external whistleblowing. For a disclosure to be protected at the 
second tier, whistleblowers must meet the criteria prescribed for the first tier. 
Additionally, the whistleblower has to reasonably believe “that the information and any 
allegation in it are substantially true and is relevant to that regulator (the organization to 
which the disclosure is made)” (Public Concern At Work, n.d.).  
Lastly, in certain circumstances in which a valid cause exists to do so or 
the previous two tiers have failed, wider public disclosures will be protected (including to 
the media), as long as the disclosures meet the criteria for the first and second tiers and 
“are reasonable in all circumstances and are not made for personal gain” (Public Concern 
At Work, n.d.). Additionally, the disclosures must fall within one of the following 
categories: “the whistleblower reasonably believed he would be victimized if he had 
raised the matter internally or with a prescribed regulator; there was no prescribed 
regulator and he reasonably believed the evidence was likely to be concealed or 
destroyed; the concern had already been raised with the employer or a prescribed 
regulator; or the concern was of an exceptionally serious nature” (Public Concern At 




circumstances: “the identity of the person to whom it was made; the seriousness of the 
concern; whether the risk or danger remains; and whether the disclosure breached a duty 
of confidence which the employer owed a third party. Where the concern has been raised 
with the employer or a prescribed regulator, the tribunal will also consider the 
reasonableness of their response. Finally, if the concern has been raised with the 
employer, the tribunal will consider whether any whistleblowing procedure in the 
organization was or should have been used” (Public Concern At Work, n.d.). 
By using this tiered approach, PIDA not only provides encouragement to 
whistleblowers through its protections, it also serves to hold organizations accountable 
for taking corrective actions to address wrongdoing and to protect the whistleblower. If 
the first tier (the organization itself) fails to act, the second tier serves as a watchdog to 
ensure the issues are handled appropriately. Should the second tier fail in its 
responsibilities to hold the first tier accountable, the third tier serves to provide the same 
pressure and accountability (Lewis, 2010). By providing protection to those who report 
internally and identifying consequences for retaliation, the PIDA encourages employers 
to establish a clear process for whistleblowers and avoid retaliatory practices.  
b. Belgium 
Whistleblowers in Belgium, also called “denunciators” (Council of 
Europe—Committe on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 2008), are afforded some 
protections based on the May 7, 2004 Whistleblowers Decree. This decree states that any 
civil servants can raise issues of negligence, abuse or irregularities (Council of Europe—
Committe on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 2008) to their supervisors, or directly to 
the internal auditing component of the Flemish Administration if their supervisor is 
involved in the wrongdoing (Lewis, 2010). If the whistleblower experiences retaliation or 
no movement on the issue occurs within 30 days, the issue can be submitted to the 
Flemish Ombudsman. Once under the protection of the government/ombudsman, any 
disciplinary actions against the whistleblower are suspended, and protection lasts until 
two years after the end of the investigation. Belgium goes further to support transparency 




received, the status of the investigation and the ultimate findings. From 2006–2008, all 
cases submitted to the Flemish Ombudsman received protection from retaliation (Lewis, 
2010). 
c. Romania  
Whistleblower protection in Romania was established with Law No. 571 
of December 14, 2004, “regarding the protection of personnel within public authorities, 
public institutions and other establishments, who report infringements” (Romanian 
Parliament, 2004). Romanian whistleblower protections have some similarities to the 
UK’s PIDA, however, while the UK legislation is balanced between the needs of the 
public and the needs of institutions/organizations, Romanian law favors the needs of the 
public. The law was established to protect members of “public authorities and 
institutions, the central public administration, local public administration, the government 
apparatus, public institutions, national companies, and autonomous administrations of 
national and local interest…[who]expose or report law infringements within public 
authorities, public institutions and other establishments, perpetrated by persons in leading 
or operational positions within public authorities and institutions” (Romanian Parliament, 
2004). Law 571 stresses eight overarching principles, including legality, public interest 
supremacy, responsibility, non-abusive sanctioning, good administration, good conduct, 
balance, and good faith. Each of these principles provides guidance for the conduct of 
whistleblowers, as well as for organizations, agencies and the government. 
Whistleblowers are required (under the principle of responsibility) to provide data or 
facts regarding the reported issue (Romanian Parliament, 2004), and can report to any of 
the following: their supervisor, the head of their agency/organization, disciplinary 
committees in the public sector, legal bodies, investigative organizations, parliament, 
mass-media, professional bodies, trade unions or employee associations, and non-
governmental organizations (Romanian Parliament, 2004). An important distinction 
between PIDA and Romanian law 571 is that while reporting through each tier is done 
consecutively in the UK (with some exception), Romanian whistleblowers can report to 




2004) as long as they meet the established requirements. Romanian law also provides for 
the ability to keep the whistleblowers identity secret if the person accused is either their 
direct or indirect supervisor (Lewis, 2010). Uniquely, Romanian law allows for 
whistleblowers to demand a press and union representative be present at any disciplinary 
hearings (Lewis, 2010). 
d. Australia  
Currently, no single, comprehensive legislation in Australia provides for 
whistleblower protection. However, eight independent acts (laws) that range from 1993–
2003 cover eight Australian territories, and the Public Service Act of 1999, which covers 
the Commonwealth. Interestingly, Australia has been the focal point for a significant 
whistleblowing study. The “Whistling While They Work” (WWTW) project is a three-
year collaborative national research project into the management and protection of 
internal witnesses, including whistleblowers, in the Australian public sector (Griffith 
University, n.d.). As part of its study, the WWTW team identified a series of best 
practices from the nine total Australian acts, which included the following key points: 
whistleblower laws must provide multiple avenues for disclosure, clear processes for 
submission should be identified, the role of disclosures to media/parliament need to 
defined, and Australia should pursue completely new legislation as opposed to amending 
previous acts. The WWTW project also identified the need for sufficient buy-in and 
support from leadership to ensure legislation is enacted, and ultimately, enforced 
appropriately. Much like the United States, Australia has proposed many bills to address 
whistleblowing; however, none of them, including the most recent Public Interest 







3. International Best Practices for Whistleblowing Policies 
Based on a review of the current U.S. whistleblowing policies and the best 
practices evident in the international whistleblowing policies above, the United States 
could improve six areas in its current policies by adopting some international best 
practices. 
• Who is covered? The United States should establish a clear 
whistleblowing policy for civil service employees of the U.S. DHS, its 
detailees and its contractors. This single policy should cover all DHS 
components, including those identified as part of the IC and the 
Transportation Security Administration. Romanian law is a prime example 
of a policy that covers all necessary parties, and the United States can 
benefit from leveraging the eight principles identified in Romanian law to 
help shape U.S. policy. Additionally, U.S. policy should specifically 
remove the requirement to be the first to report wrongdoing.  
• What types of misconduct for reporting are covered? It is a tremendous 
challenge to write any policy that covers, in detail, all possibilities and 
issues that could potentially qualify as misconduct. While the current U.S. 
policy identifies a number of specific categories that qualify as protected 
disclosures, the United States should consider including the phrase “issues 
of public interest,” as identified in the UK PIDA.  
• What types of reprisals for reporting are covered? As with the question 
above, it is nearly impossible to identify all possible reprisals or methods 
of retaliation that could possibly be used punitively against 
whistleblowers. While the U.S. language currently is broad with the use of 
“personnel action,” clear issues exist concerning the interpretation or 
adherence to that language, particularly in terms of security clearances. 
The UK’s PIDA uses the word “victimization” to define reprisals in terms 
of their effect on the whistleblower as opposed to the employer. While 
including this language may not prevent the prohibited actions from being 
taken initially, it may steer the investigation and adjudication in favor of 
whistleblowers and the U.S./DHS should take action in support of that 
objective. 
• When should legal protection begin and should there be a statute of 
limitations for filling legal action? U.S. policy currently puts the burden 
on the whistleblower with regard to filing deadlines and requirements, as 
well as limitations on when protections begin and end. The United States 
should learn from Belgium and establish protection from the time of the 





• How should employees proceed with a formal complaint? The current 
U.S. model for whistleblower submissions is broken. As far as 
international best practices for processes, the three-tiered approach 
identified by the UK’s PIDA is by far the most effective at balancing the 
needs of the public with the needs for the organization/secrecy. U.S. 
policies do not currently follow a tiered process, and explicitly do not 
cover internal whistleblowing. The U.S./DHS should establish a multi-
tiered approach using similar guidelines as identified by the UK’s PIDA, 
and utilize a proxy similar to the Belgian ombudsman. 
• Tier-One: Internal. Internal reporting should include submissions 
within the originating agency/component (to include within the 
whistleblower’s chain of command) to the department’s Office of 
the IG or the OSC. 
• Tier-Two: External—Proxy. External reporting should include 
submissions to Congress, and the DHS should establish a third 
party to coordinate on behalf of the whistleblower, similar to the 
Flemish Ombudsman. This coordinator could function as the proxy 
for society. Both Congress and the third party could serve as 
oversight and function as external auditing organizations over tier-
one organizations, working with them to ensure the wrongdoing is 
addressed and to prevent reprisals/retaliation.  
• Tier-Three: External—Public. In circumstances in which neither 
Congress nor the third party is able to facilitate action on behalf of 
the whistleblower, the whistleblower or the third party (after a 
clearly established period of time) would have the option of 
submitting the information to the public/media. The whistleblower 
would retain protection as long as the criteria for public disclosure 
were met (identified in the PIDA and above).  
• Is whistleblowing incentivized? U.S. policies are currently leading the 
world regarding incentivizing whistleblowing, specifically, under the 
Frank-Dodd and Sarbanes-Oxley Acts. However, those policies apply to 
the financial sector and no functional equivalent exists for homeland 
security employees. The U.S./DHS should enhance the False Claims Act 
or establish an incentive program to provide similar rewards to homeland 
security whistleblowers as is provided to financial whistleblowers by the 
Frank-Dodd and Sarbanes-Oxley Acts. 
Based on the realities of the current whistleblowing environment and the issues 






silent or to report wrongdoing through unauthorized channels. While some of these 
channels have been around for hundreds of years, others are only now emerging from the 
new information-sharing paradigm of the Internet and Web 2.0. 
B. UNAUTHORIZED PROCESSES FOR WHISTLEBLOWING  
1. Fourth Estate 
Traditional media organizations have played a role in the disclosure of secret 
information for hundreds of years. Politicians in British Parliament leaked information to 
newspapers for political gain in the 18th century (A Web of English History, 2009). 
Parliamentary proceedings were off limits to newspapers prior to 1770, and leaking was 
used as a tactic to force a debate beyond a stalemate or to a re-decision, through the 
impact of public opinion, which was primarily employed by calculating advantage-
seekers who used the public to influence internal power struggles (Rosen, 2010). It is 
important to note that this tactic was effective only because of Parliament’s efforts to 
keep its proceedings secret. By restricting public access to all information, politicians 
could leak small portions of it that would provide only one side of the debate, usually that 
which would favor the side of the party leaking the information. This role of the press in 
government affairs was termed the “Fourth Estate” by Edmund Burke, comparing the 
function of the news media to that of the three houses then in Parliament (Rosen, 2010). 
The news media has continued, since that time, to play a key role in the leaking of 
political information, and, up until recently, newspapers and other media outlets were 
effectively the only ones that could publish and distribute something to a worldwide 
audience (Reinventing the News Room, 2010). The Pentagon Papers and the Watergate 
scandal are two examples of 20th century leaks to the news media that significantly 
impacted U.S. politics. However, the freedom of the press to pursue investigative 
journalism and to promote transparency and accountability has decreased significantly. 
As a result of economic difficulties faced by media organizations, pressure to compete 
with the entertainment industry, requirements for news desks to be profitable, and the 
increasing ability of the U.S. Government to influence news organizations, media’s role 




News Media, columnist Bob Weeks writes, “The cure for a dishonest politician is an 
investigative reporter willing to allocate the time to expose the truth. However, the 
decline of resources at newspapers around the nation has increased the vacuum in 
…coverage. As such, newspapers around the country are curbing reporters’ ability to 
spend the time or money to investigate a story in addition to the daily beat they write” 
(Weeks, 2010). 
In a recent Gallup poll, only 34% of Americans believe that U.S. media 
organizations are doing a good job in fulfilling their role as a watchdog of the Obama 
Administration (Saad, 2010). With the decline of investigative journalism, media 
organizations are then forced to become reliant on outside information sources—
whistleblowers to provide the information on which they can report. The likelihood that 
whistleblowers will choose to release information to an organization is dependent on two 
primary conditions, the ability to maintain anonymity, and the ability of that organization 
to publish the material to a wide audience. With traditional news media organizations 
being pressured by the U.S. Government to release the names of their sources, anonymity 
can no longer be guaranteed (Shenon, 2010; Egelko, 2006). Additionally, with the recent 
release of information indicating that the U.S. Government successfully delayed, for over 
a year, the publication of information by the New York Times on warrantless wiretapping, 
as well as the increasing prevalence of “pay walls” on news websites, the perception of a 
traditional news organization’s ability to communicate the information to a wide 
audience has declined significantly (Democracy Now, 2008; Rosen, 2010). Thus, the 
media landscape is changing, and traditional news organizations are no longer the only 
game in town. As Edmund Burke’s ‘Fourth Estate’ has seen its effectiveness dwindle, a 
new Fifth Estate has been established and it is growing stronger every day (Sam Adams 
Associates for Integrity in Intelligence, 2010). 
2. Fifth Estate 
In June of 2009, Clay Shirky gave a talk at the U.S. State Department on the 
transformation of the media landscape and the impact that the new ‘social media’ has on 




understanding of the relationship between the media and the public, from a one-way 
‘producer/consumer’ relationship to a new paradigm where anyone can be a producer 
(Shirky, 2009). Traditional news media is increasingly finding itself on the consuming 
end, identifying and reproducing information that they have received from this new 
media paradigm or the Fifth Estate. The Fifth Estate consists of those organizations that 
exist beyond the realm of government control and authority, organizations, such as 
Wikileaks.5 Wikileaks has been characterized as the “world’s first stateless news 
organization,” simultaneously existing ‘everywhere,’ bound by no one country’s laws or 
jurisdictions, and releasing information without regard for any one national interest 
(Reinventing the News Room, 2010; Twitter:Wikileaks, n.d.). Wikileaks was born of the 
Internet, and like the Internet, they have no physical address or location of which to 
speak. Wikileaks maintains servers in multiple countries, has over 300 Internet addresses 
registered, and relies heavily on the free press laws of countries like Sweden and Iceland 
to offer it legal protection from the inevitable ‘legal and political attacks’ from 
governments and private companies whose secrets have been exposed (Assange, 2009). 
The description of what Wikileaks is often depends on where the information is coming 
from, and whether that source supports or protests the actions that Wikileaks has taken. 
The debate as to whether Wikileaks is a “whistleblower” organization, or a “treasonous” 
organization, continues to be fought on the front pages of newspapers, across the Internet, 
and in the public sphere worldwide (Associated Press, 2010; Baker, 2010). While not the 
first and certainly not the only website to offer leaked information to the public 
(Cryptome), their innovative use of technology and leveraging the power of the Internet 
has catapulted them to the front of the debate regarding secrecy and transparency in the 
21st century.  
Wikileaks is an information clearinghouse, described on its website as a “not-for-
profit media organization [whose] goal is to bring important news and information to the 
public” (Wikileaks: About Us, n.d.). It was founded in December of 2006 by a small 
                                                 




group of anti-secrecy activists with the goal of creating an “intelligence agency of the 
people” (Symington, 2009). While that ambitious goal has be hampered by the many 
controversies surrounding Wikileaks as an organization, over the past four years, they 
have succeeded in releasing over 1.2 million documents to the public, more than the rest 
of the world’s news media combined (Nystedt, 2009; Assange, 2009). They have 
accomplished this release through their use of information technology to maintain 
sources’ anonymity, using “a convoluted network of Internet service providers, computer 
servers, hard drives, encryption and private, ‘virtual tunnels’” (Boyd, 2010). While leaks 
in the past have been person to person (or person to organization), the Wikileaks 
approach allows an anonymous source to provide information to an anonymous 
organization, providing a never before seen level of confidence in maintaining that 
anonymity (Boyd, 2010). Jim Lewis, the head of the Technology and Public Policy 
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington states, “with 
the Pentagon Papers, you had one fellow, Daniel Ellsberg, smuggling paper out the 
building and giving it to a reporter. Today, in the Wikileaks example, you have some 
unknown number of people who are able to contribute to a website that thousands, or 
even millions of people, can look at, right now” (Boyd, 2010) that is a model with which 
traditional news organizations cannot compete, and as a result, they are being forced to 
redefine their role in a “Wikileaks world” (Baxter, 2010). It is important to note, 
however, that Wikileaks is constantly adapting its model to be more effective, and part of 
their evolution involves a larger role for traditional media organizations. In an 
environment increasingly reliant on data, Wikileaks has experienced difficulty in 
distinguishing and focusing the world’s attention on significant data. Wikileaks found 
that when they released all of the data, along with their own commentary, the focus was 
not on the information itself, but on the significance of Wikileaks as an organization. Mr. 
Assange elaborates, “It’s counterintuitive, you’d think the bigger and more important the 
document is, the more likely it will be reported on but that’s absolutely not true. It’s 
about supply and demand. Zero supply equals high demand, it has value. As soon as we 
release the material, the supply goes to infinity, so the perceived value goes to zero” 




traditional media organizations, providing an embargo period to increase the exclusivity 
of the information to a single or a few organizations. Wikileaks’ ability to leverage the 
technological capabilities of the Internet and to adapt and evolve as circumstances 
require, demonstrates some of the potential impact that ‘Fifth Estate’ organizations could 
have on the role of traditional media organizations and the future of information 
dissemination as a whole. In fact, as a demonstration of the success of the Wikileaks 
model for anonymous submission, both Al-Jazeera and The Wall Street Journal 
developed their own online whistleblower submission process. 
Wikileaks is not without its share of controversies, and both reasonable and 
speculative concerns have been identified regarding their operations. Immediately after 
the first release of information on their website, Wikileaks was attacked on its credibility 
(Symington, 2009). A few weeks later, John Young (the founder of cryptome.org—a 
similar anti-secrecy website) accused Wikileaks of being a front for the CIA (Symington, 
2009). Three primary issues have confronted Wikileaks, and continue to be explored by 
the U.S. Government and news organizations: the actions of Wikileaks will damage 
“national security” (Montalbano, 2010), they were irresponsible for not doing a thorough 
review of the information they released (Aftergood, 2010b) resulting in the release of the 
names of Afghan informants, which placed their lives in danger (Reals, 2010), and that 
their secretive spokesperson Julian Assange has alternate agendas (Assange, 2010) (and 
his own series of controversies). Julian Assange is currently fighting extradition on 
allegations of sex crimes in Sweden, while Wikileaks faces trouble of its own (Addley, 
2011). 
Much speculation is focused on the future of Wikileaks, and whether it will be 
able to continue to function given the tremendous opposition moving against it and the 
personal issues confronting Julian Assange. Ben Laurie, a member of the Wikileaks 
Advisory Board stated, “Wikileaks depends on the enthusiasm of a small number of 
people, and particularly on Assange. If he met with a nasty accident, maybe Wikileaks 
would fizzle out” (Symington, 2009). This situation does indeed seem to be a likely 




some prominent Wikileaks staff members leaving the organization (Blodget, 2010). 
While some might see this as a sign signaling the end of Wikileaks, it is a shortsighted 
viewpoint. The existence of Wikileaks as an organization is irrelevant now, and their 
most significant contribution is not the release of 1.2 million potentially classified 
documents. The most significant impact of Wikileaks is their successful demonstration 
and validation of the ‘Wikileaks model.’  
The recent split may or may not portend the end of Wikileaks as an organization; 
however, it does provide a glimpse into the future of whistleblowing. In an interview with 
Der Spiegel Online, Daniel Schmitt,6 the second most senior member of Wikileaks next 
to Assange, talks about his intentions moving forward outside of Wikileaks. He says, “I 
will continue to do my part to ensure that the idea of a decentralized whistleblower 
platform stays afloat. I will work on that now. And that, incidentally, is in line with one 
of our original shared convictions -- in the end, there needs to be a thousand Wikileaks” 
(Domscheit-Berg, 2010). Ultimately, the destruction of Wikileaks through the efforts of 
governments and/or private organizations will not end the leaking and proliferation of 
secrets. Don Burke, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s “Intellipedia” project, 
has said that in 15 years, there will be no more secrets (Spaulding, 2010). Wikileaks has 
demonstrated the ability to leak and propagate information to a worldwide audience, and 
while this might seem to bolster the justification for the current U.S. policies and culture 
of over-classification, overloading the government classification system actually weakens 
its ability to protect the truly important information (Stewart, 2010). An old saying from 
1960s and 1970s supports this premise, that “when everything is secret—nothing is 
secret” (Agrell, 2002), and if the United States continues on its path to try and maintain 
the status quo with regard to secrecy rather than adapting, it will find itself unprepared 
and behind the curve when the “lights are turned up” (Spaulding, 2010).  
                                                 




3. Secrecy and Over-classification 
The current U.S. policies governing the management of classified information are 
inadequate in the face of the over-classification problem facing the U.S. Government. 
Despite the repeated statements from the current administration promoting increased 
transparency, including the issuance of E.O. 13526 and the passing of the Reducing 
Over-Classification Act by Congress, over-classification remains a serious problem 
facing the homeland security enterprise and the U.S. Government as a whole.  
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the first E.O. on Classified Information on March 
22, 1940; however, the debate on the balance between secrecy and transparency in U.S. 
Government affairs dates back to Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. Nineteen 
E.O. on Classified Information have been signed since Roosevelt’s first E.O. 8381, the 
most recent of which is E.O. 13526 by President Obama in December of 2009 (Kosar, 
2010). Unfortunately, none of the E.O.s has been able to answer the question, how to 
balance government accountability and public need-to-know against national security 
interests?  
Three components comprise the classification issue: initial classification, 
personnel/policy implementation, and oversight/declassification.  
• Initial Classification. The current guidance on classification levels are 
based on long-standing definitions of the three primary markings: 
confidential, secret, and top secret. Each description is based on the same 
concept, that “the unauthorized disclosure of [information] which could be 
expected to cause damage to the national security that the original 
classification authority is able to identify or describe” (Office of the White 
House Press Secretary, 2009). Little specificity exists regarding the 
definitions of these key terms, and currently, the definitions used by each 
classifier differs in the implementation of this policy. National Security is 
loosely defined as “the national defense or foreign relations of the United 
States” (Kosar, 2009), and no clear definitions exist that constitute 
‘damage,’ whether ‘serious,’ ‘exceptionally grave’ or otherwise.  
• Personnel and the implementation of classification policies, 
accountability, and consequences. The current estimate for the total 






(Aftergood, 2009). Each person has a different perspective on 
classification, varying levels of training, and very little accountability in 
terms of over-classification.  
• Oversight, information sharing and declassification. Currently included 
are the provisions regarding the duration of classification, internal review 
processes for classified information, cross agency and public information 
sharing. Public disputes regarding classified information (Freedom of 
Information Act), whistleblowers, both legitimate and illegal (often 
determined ex post facto), and ultimately, declassification through the 
National Archives and Records Administration. Presently, little oversight 
occurs of classification actions, FOIA is inconsistently implemented, and 
Congress recently killed the Whistleblower Enhancement Act. 
While E.O. 13526 takes some steps towards increasing government transparency 
and information sharing while decreasing the problem of over-classification, it only 
represents a moderate shift in the traditional secrecy vs. transparency spectrum. It relies 
primarily on policy changes, and while it hints at creating cultural change (“need to 
know” vs. “need to share”), ultimately its success will be won or lost based on the 
personnel implementing it. For example, the review of fundamental classification 
guidance is a positive step; unfortunately, it is, in many cases, being reviewed by the 
same people who implemented the incorrect guidance in the first place.  
According to Clay Shirky, the world is currently experiencing “the largest 
increase in expressive capability in human history” (Shirky, 2009). Not only has the 
Internet drastically improved the ability to share information, it has drastically improved 
the ability to create information. With tools, such as Twitter (Twitter: About Us, n.d.), 
Facebook (Facebook: About Us, n.d.), and Usahidi (Ushahidi: About Us, n.d.), people 
can send messages around the world in near real-time and provide firsthand accounts of 
actions and events taking place. Governments worldwide are rapidly discovering that 
their ability to control information is dwindling, and Wikileaks is but one symptom of a 
dynamic change in the world of information as the world knows it. For the U.S. 
Government to protect its secrets, it requires a dramatic change in policy and approach: 
an acknowledgement that embarrassing secrets and proof of wrongdoing does not equate 
to ‘national security,’ that current government methods, such as Offices of the IG, the 




transparency, and an acknowledgement that the media environment has compensated, and 
is, as a whole, beyond government influence. It is unrealistic to think that everything can 
be declassified, and both sides of the debate acknowledge that legitimate topics (e.g., 
nuclear weapons design) should be kept out of the public domain.  
E.O. 13526 is only in its first year of execution and it is premature to say whether 
these steps alone will be effective. However, technology has changed the paradigm in 
which the world communicates and U.S. Government policies on classification and 
information sharing require a significant update. In light of the fact that leaks will likely 
increase over the coming years and secrets will become harder to maintain, the U.S. 
Government should support and expand upon the goals of E.O. 13526 and reduce its 
overall classified footprint, with a view towards restoring public trust. Achieving both 
these goals will ultimately contribute to the safety and security of the homeland. 
4. Public Trust 
Despite the commonly accepted and promoted concept of the importance of 
public involvement in government affairs, and the efforts of agencies, such as the DHS to 
increase public engagement, public trust has declined significantly during the past 
decade. A 2005 Harris poll determined that among Americans, only 27% trust the 
government (Covey, 2006), and according to the PEW Research Center, with the 
exception of a significant dip in November of 2001, distrust and anger towards the 
government has been rising to 86% as of April of 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2011). 
With regard to whistleblowing and transparency, the actions of the Obama and Bush 
administrations have only served to increase public (and whistleblower) distrust. The 
FBI’s pursuit of whistleblowers prompted Senators Grassley and Leahy to send a letter to 
FBI director Mueller identifying a “concern…that the latest investigation was a sign of 
the FBI’s apparent haste to launch an OPR probe every time an agent speaks publicly 
about problems within the FBI” (Grassley, 2004). Significant concerns were raised with 
the appointment of Scott Bloch to the OSC, which, in a 2004 GAO report, indicated that 
the OSC only met its statutory timelines 26% of the time and that 95–97% of its 




Additionally, Bloch was placed under investigation for alleged retaliation against 
employees; discrimination based on sexual orientation, and on April 27, 2010, pleaded 
guilty to criminal contempt of Congress and is facing jail time (Hsu, 2011). Creating a 
circumstance on which the head of the organization responsible for investigating 
retaliation on behalf of whistleblowers, is in fact, conducting retaliatory practices himself, 
combined with the Obama Administration’s unparalleled prosecution of whistleblowers 
(significantly more than any previous administration (Greenwald, 2010)), has damaged 
public perception and trust in the government process.  
When it comes to whistleblowing, trust is one of the most important factors, 
which guides the activity. In a MSPB study, three of the top four reasons why 
whistleblowers did not come forward had to do with fear of retaliation (Project on 
Government Oversight, 2005). However, trust as it has been traditionally defined 
(Giddens, 1990),7 does not really capture the significance of trust in this context. When it 
comes to the relationship between whistleblowers and the government, Rashid and 
Edmondson’s definition of ‘risky trust’ is more applicable (Rashid, 2011).8 It is important 
to acknowledge whistleblowers’ careers, reputations, and livelihoods are often at stake. If 
whistleblowers do not trust the government to act with their best interest in mind, they 
will continue to either stay silent, or report wrongdoing through unauthorized channels 
that do not have the same high level of personal risk associated with it. 
5. Trust and Third Parties 
The use of a third party to overcome trust issues in otherwise dyadic relationships 
are already commonly used in the areas of E-commerce, mediation, secure 
communications and online transactions (Blaze, 1996; Franklin, 1997). In Building 
Consumer Trust Online, Hoffman, Novak and Peralta state, “in the near term, this [lack 
of trust] cannot be easily resolved, but we can address it by giving consumers the 
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opportunity to be anonymous or pseudonymous when engaging in information exchanges 
and online transactions,” and that the goal is to provide “traceable anonymity,” which 
“gives Web providers no clues about consumers’ identities but leaves this information in 
the hands of a third party” (Hoffman, 1999). Leveraging the use of third parties to 
promote government accountability is not a new concept, and can be seen in the use of 
semi-independent investigation organizations (IG, and GAO, the ‘watchdog’ role of 
media as the Fourth Estate, and in the whistleblowing arena through the UK’s three-tiered 
policy for whistleblower submissions, which uses a ‘proxy for society’ as its second tier 
(Lewis, 2010).  
Previous attempts have actually be made by the government to leverage 
technology and anonymity to promote whistleblower activities, specifically, with the 
GAO’s FRAUDNET (Government Accountability Office, 2009) and the DoD’s ‘Defense 
Hotline’ (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2007), which all seem to support the 
concept of “horizontal accountability” as described by Mark Bovens. 
Partly in reaction to a perceived lack of trust in government, there is an 
urge in many western democracies for more direct and explicit 
accountability relations between public agencies on the one hand and 
clients, citizens and civil society, including the media, on the other hand. 
The latter should become forums of political accountability, so the 
argument goes, and agencies or individual public managers should feel 
obliged to account for their performance to the public at large or to civil 
interest groups, charities, and associations of clients. This would be 
horizontal accountability in the true sense, as the complete hierarchical 
chain, including Parliament, is surpassed and the agency, the minister, or 
the public manager is directly accountable to the citizenry. (Bovens, 2005) 
The identification of the appropriate entity to function as the third party in this 
matter is critical. It could be argued that the government currently uses third parties 
already with regard to whistleblowers (through the use of IGs, GAO, and the OSC), 
however, in addition to the issues discussed above, all these organizations share the same 
flaw in that they are government bodies, funded through government channels and whose 





Whether this actually creates conflicts of interest or just the perception of them, they 
currently do not have the ability to serve as a facilitating third party and increase trust 
amongst the public. 
6. Realities of Anonymous Reporting 
The solution proposed by this thesis relies on the concept of anonymity to 
increase the likelihood of reporting. The concept of anonymity in whistleblowing is not 
new, nor is the implementation of solutions based on anonymity novel in government. 
The development and promotion of ‘hotlines’ in government were established with the 
passage of the Inspectors General Act of 1978 (Johnson, 2003). Since that time, the 
number of hotlines has significantly increased, as has their use. In 1989, the DoD Hotline 
received 12,000 calls per year, increasing, to 14,000 in 1992, and by 1997, the DoD 
hotline received 8,220 calls in six months. In 1997, the DoD Inspector General claimed 
that, since its inception, the hotline had saved the government over $391 million 
(Johnson, 2003). The DoD Hotline and the Inspector General’s FraudNET program have 
even expanded to allow for ‘anonymous’ submissions through the Internet. However, 
significant concerns have been raised regarding the effectiveness and protections 
provided by hotlines. According to a report released by the Government Accountability 
Project in 1997, hotlines have “an abysmal track record in terms of investigation of 
allegations, substantiation of charges, and corrective action” (Miethe, 1999). In The Art of 
Anonymous Whistleblowing, the authors recount the story of a Chief Petty Officer who 
used the DoD Hotline to submit an anonymous report. The next morning he was called 
into his security officer’s conference room and told a call had been received informing 
him that someone had tried to contact the IG. The security officer directed the Chief Petty 
Officer to “find the caller and plug the leak” (Project on Government Oversight, 2002). 
Stories like this highlight the problems associated with hotline use, including the inherent 
conflicts of interest of hotlines, which fall under the same organization as the reporting 
employee. When an administrative contracting officer for the Defense Logistics Agency 





unsuccessful attempts to get her organization’s management to investigate. The DoD 
Hotline referred the case back to her management for investigation, who closed the case 
as “unsubstantiated” (Johnson, 2003).  
Significant concerns regarding confidentiality and anonymity provided by 
hotlines have been raised. While hotlines often provide claims of anonymity, they offer 
little or no protections other than the assurances granted through their privacy policies. 
Potential whistleblowers often do not understand the risks associated with 
communicating with hotlines, either trusting hotlines to strip out personally identifiable 
information, or assuming protections by calling, emailing, or submitting complaints via 
the Internet (see section on technology evaluation). This concern is so significant, that 
The Whistleblower’s Handbook goes as far to say, “don’t blindly trust corporate-
sponsored hotlines” (Kohn, 2011). The concerns regarding confidentiality and anonymity 
expand beyond corporate/government sponsored hotlines. Following the success of the 
Wikileaks model for anonymous submission, both Al-Jazeera and The Wall Street 
Journal developed their own online whistleblower submission process. Shortly after their 
implementation, internet security experts panned both organizations (including a 
Wikileaks volunteer) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) for promoting “false 
promises of anonymity” (Fakhoury, 2011). The general consensus of whistleblowing 
advocates is that hotlines have the potential to be useful, but significant risks are 
associated with their use. The EFF concludes their analysis of The Wall Street Journal 
and Al-Jazeera’s submission sites by stating “these websites are misleading and…use of 
them by people who risk prosecution or retaliation for bringing sunshine to corruption, 
illegal behavior, or other topics worthy of whistleblowing, is risky at best and dangerous 
at worst” (Fakhoury, 2011). 
Over the past decade, an increasing number of whistleblowers have come 
forward, and despite the risks associated with their disclosures, many of them began by 
reporting wrongdoing within the authorized process. In some of those cases, it was only 
after they were unsuccessful in affecting change that they chose to seek assistance 




Drake and the recent issues with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms ‘Fast and 
Furious’ program began as internal disclosures that did not result in action. Thomas 
Drake was a National Security Agency (NSA) employee who raised questions about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of some post-9/11 NSA programs to his management. After 
being dismissed, he submitted a report to the DoD IG’s office on what he reasonably 
believed was organizational wrongdoing by the NSA (including its telecommunications 
collection program). His next step was to inform Congress of the issues, and only after he 
had exhausted his authorized options, did he then decide to disclose the wrongdoing to 
the Baltimore Sun. He was tried under the Espionage Act, much like Daniel Ellsberg of 
the Pentagon Papers; however, all charges against him were dropped in return for his 
guilty plea against the lesser misdemeanor charge of misusing the agency’s computer 
system. Drake lost his job and his pension and now works at an Apple store (Zetter, 
2010).  
ATF Agent John Dodson had questioned his supervisors over the ‘Operation Fast 
and Furious,’ an ATF program, which, in an attempt to shut down weapons trafficking 
networks, allowed Mexican drug cartels to purchase weapons from U.S. arms dealers. 
Dodson’s management quickly reassigned him to another job, while taking no action to 
stop or modify the program. Following the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry 
(by weapons purchased through the ‘Fast and Furious’ program), Dodson submitted a 
complaint to the ATF Office of Chief Counsel and Ethics section of the Office of the IG. 
While little action on the part of ATF leadership was taken, he was contacted by 
Congress, which proceeded to conduct an in-depth investigation. Six other agents came 
forward to support Dodson’s report on the ATF program. Dodson and three other agents 
were transferred to other offices, one agent retired, and the other agents involved with 
this issue have requested investigations into agency retaliation (Lajeunesse, 2011). 
These stories support the information identified above, and serve as examples of 
how current processes for authorized submissions fall short of providing adequate 
whistleblower protections and often do not result in the redress of organizational 




unauthorized processes to achieve their goals. The over-classification problem inherent in 
government only serves to encourage whistleblowers to make disclosures, and the lack of 
public trust in the authorized system causes them to seek unauthorized methods for 
disclosure. However, unauthorized processes also fail to provide whistleblower 
protection, and can result in the exposure of truly sensitive information that should be 
restricted for reasons of national security.  
C. TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION 
1. Current Technologies/Background 
To develop potential solutions, the vulnerabilities of current technologies 
available for anonymous submission must be identified. Three primary means exist for a 
whistleblower to submit information to the government: over the phone, through email, 
or through the use of a web browser. While the phone can provide some anonymity and 
information security through the use of pay-as-you-go/disposable cell phones, major 
concerns are associated with discovery through other means (e.g., the purchase of the 
phone in the first place, voice recognition, the location associated with the origination of 
the call, etc.). These factors, combined with the inherent transmission limitations 
associated with using a phone (only verbal submissions, no documents, etc.), make the 
use of phones a possibility, albeit an unlikely solution, to this problem.  
The systems associated with electronic communications are divided up into two 
categories, high-latency systems and low-latency systems. High-latency systems can 
experience and tolerate high delays in the transmission of information, and are generally 
used in non-interactive or non-real-time applications, such as email. Low-latency systems 
generally do not experience and have low tolerance for delay in the transmission of 
information, and are intended for use in real-time applications, such as web browsing, 
instant messaging, and VOIP (Mayer, 2009). 
a. High-Latency Systems 
Solutions for high-latency systems are able to provide some of the best 




possible for a whistleblower to submit information over email to the U.S. Government 
with strong anonymity protections. Anonymous remailers essentially serve as a 
middleman, forwarding the contents of the email to the recipient without the recipient 
receiving knowledge on the original sender’s identity. In their 2009 paper, “On 
Anonymity in an Electronic Society: A Survey of Anonymous Communication Systems,” 
Matthew Edman and Bulent Yenner from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute provide an 
excellent description of the process. 
Imagine Alice is a corporate whistleblower who wants to mail a letter to 
The New York Times revealing some misconduct, but still wants to remain 
anonymous for fear of losing her job. Similarly to how IP addresses can 
reveal who sent a particular packet, simply writing a letter and dropping it 
in the local post office box would leak information to the recipient about 
where the message originated because of the postal markings on the 
envelope. Instead, Alice places the envelope addressed to The New York 
Times inside another envelope addressed to a third party named Charlie. 
This outer envelope is then placed inside yet another envelope addressed 
to another person, Sam. Alice then places the multiply enveloped letter 
into her local post office box. When Sam receives the envelope, he opens 
it and finds another envelope addressed to Charlie. Recognizing the 
envelope is not addressed to him, Sam then drops it in his local post office 
box. Similarly, when Charlie receives and opens the envelope addressed to 
him, he finds another addressed to The New York Times, which he then 
also forwards. Since the envelope received at The New York Times came 
from Charlie’s post office, it does not give away any information about 
Alice’s location. The envelope received by Sam can be used to identify 
Alice, but Sam only knows the next hop in the path and not the letter’s 
content or its intended destination. Only if all people in the letter’s path 
collaborate can they identify Alice as the sender of the letter received by 
the newspaper. 
Remailers also provide added security in that not only do they forward the 
information, often times it will be mixed with other messages, placed in batches, and 
forwarded as a means to guard against unwanted observers. Three primary types of 
anonymous remailers exist: Type I or cypherpunk remailers; Type II or Mixmaster 






(Mixminion: A Type III Anonymous Remailer, n.d.) is the most advanced remailer 
available and can be used free of charge, unfortunately, however, it requires a level of 
computer savvy that the average government employee may not possess.  
The use of email provides one of the best solutions from an anonymity 
perspective, although, it leaves much to be desired in terms of reliability and information 
security. Anonymous remailers are vulnerable to numerous types of attacks, suffer from 
unreliability concerning delivery, have significant issues associated with recipient replies, 
and have the potential to compromise the security of the information being transmitted. 
Email exists as a potential solution for the submission of non-sensitive unclassified 
information; however, a more robust solution is required to include additional measures, 
which ensure information security and address the whistleblowers’ need for feedback. 
b. Low-Latency Systems 
The processes associated with high-latency anonymity solutions can create 
delays of many hours and even days prior to the completion of the transmission, a 
solution, which does not work in the low-latency environment of the web. However, the 
overarching concept associated with low-latency anonymity solutions is very similar to 
the one described in the Alice and The New York Times example above. The submitter 
(Alice in that case) could, through the use of one of the following three types of 
anonymity solutions; hide their IP address and location from the recipient (The New York 
Times). The three categories of low-latency system solutions are as follows: Proxy 
Servers, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Onion Routing. 
(1) Proxy Servers. Proxy servers are essentially a forwarding 
service (Sam, from the previously cited example), who, unlike the remailers described 
above, do not manipulate the data in any way prior to forwarding. A proxy server would 
allow the sender to submit data through a third-party network in a manner in which only 
the fact that the information came from a third party is discernible to the recipient. Basic 
web-proxy services, such as Anonwatch (AnonWatch, n.d.), are weak on both anonymity 
and information security; however, the proxy concept has spawned two additional 





Figure 1.   Information Flow Through a Proxy Server (From: Public Proxy Servers, 
n.d.) 
(2) Virtual Private Networks. VPNs are currently used by the 
government and other organizations as the means through which an offsite employee can 
access its organizations’ network resources by creating a secure tunnel between the 
organization’s servers and the end user.  
 
Figure 2.   Using a Virtual Private Network (From: Hide Your IP Address with a VPN, 
2011) 
Relevant to the whistleblowing submission process, VPNs provide 




submit information to the government through the network provided by the third-party 
VPN provider, maintaining anonymity from the government. Significant issues are 
associated with the use of VPN technology for whistleblowing concerning both 
anonymity and information security. Regarding anonymity, while the use of VPN 
software allows the sender to hide his identity from the recipient, it does NOT hide his 
identity from the third-party VPN provider. The possibility exists that the government 
could subpoena or pressure the VPN provider to provide its logs, payment history, and/or 
other information that could compromise the identity of the sender.  
VPNs also pose a potential problem in terms of information 
security; while a VPN does provide significant protection from the snooping of outside 
parties, the company itself would have potential access to the information being 
forwarded. The use of end-to-end encryption reduces this possibility significantly, but it 
is understandable that the government would be reluctant to provide a third-party 
company (many in foreign countries) access to sensitive information. Many pay-for-
service VPNs are available currently, including StrongVPN (StrongVPN, n.d.), ViprVPN 
(GoldenFrog, n.d.), WiTopia (WiTopia, 20102), Anonymizer (Anonymizer, n.d.), and 
Xerobank (xerobank, 2012).  
(3) Onion Routing. The approach used by onion routing is 
different from that of a VPN in that instead of one layer of anonymity protection (the 
VPN provider); multiple layers of anonymity protection exist (as described by Alice and 
The New York Times example above). The most prevalent onion routing system available, 
The Onion Router or TOR (Tor, n.d.a), was actually developed by the Navy (Onion 
Routing, n.d.) to provide anonymity and security in its communications. It was made 
public when it realized that if only the Navy was using the system, the anonymity set was 
1, and therefore, it could not use it anonymously. Only when the user base of the system 
increased would the system achieve its goals. Instead of the single path identified by the 
VPN server, TOR selects random paths of three nodes from thousands of possible nodes, 





Figure 3.   Accessing the Internet via TOR (From: Randomwire, 2011). 
In terms of its potential for use in the whistleblowing process, TOR 
provides great anonymity for a single use submission, and with the use of end-to-end 
encryption (such as TLS/SSL), it also provides significant information security. Concern 
still exists from the government’s perspective regarding sensitive information traveling 
through unknown nodes (even while encrypted). TOR is not the only solution available 
for the Onion Routing approach, Jondonym (JonDonym, (n.d.) and I2P (I2P, n.d.) are 
other paid solutions that claim to address some of the concerns associated with TOR’s 
vulnerabilities and add some user-friendly applications. 
c. Vulnerabilities 
Many vulnerabilities are associated with the use of these technologies, 
including Traffic/Trend analysis (Hermann, 2009), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks 
(Zusman, 2009), Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, as well as identification vulnerabilities 
associated with cookies, JavaScript, flash, and other plug-ins that could bypass any 
system (VPN or Onion Router) and reveal the sender’s identity (Clark, 2010). Concerns 
also exist regarding the use of public computers (for both anonymity and information 
security), the possibility of key loggers and malware compromising the senders’ system, 
and the issues associated with anonymous payment for services (private VPNs, 




community and hacker community very active in pursuing both vulnerabilities and 
solutions. Over 40 publications exist on electronic anonymity, going back as far as 1981 
on Freehaven.net, which provides in-depth detail on the issues identified above. 
However, for the whistleblowing environment, the researcher believes one or more 
technological solutions can be applied to provide protections through anonymity. 
D. FINDINGS  
The conclusions in this thesis could each be debated and explored in extraordinary 
detail as thesis topics in their own right. However, based on the research and analysis 
conducted above, the researcher has chosen to accept the following premises as true, and 
proceeds to focus on the solution to the defined problem. 
• Overclassification is a problem 
• Information sharing is critical to both U.S. security and U.S democracy  
• Homeland security efforts require public (to include its employees and 
partners) trust and support to succeed  
• The ability to keep secrets and maintain control of classified information 
will continue to decrease 
• Decreasing overclassification will save the United States money 
• Whistleblowing is a civic duty 
• The government is committed to providing whistleblower protections 
• Whistleblowers are in large part motivated by patriotism 
• Anonymity is a positive incentive for whistleblowers 
• Fourth and Fifth Estates provide alternatives to the government process 
• Public trust in the government has declined 
• Public trust can be increased through the use of third parties 
• Technology exists to provide anonymity to whistleblowers 
• Current options for whistleblowing are inadequate 
These premises are important to understand prior to the identification and 
evaluation of potential solutions, as they form the foundation and justification for the 




• Over-classification is a problem. The U.S. Government has repeatedly 
and openly acknowledged the problem of over-classification. In a 
statement by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, J. 
William Leonard, to the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on 
Government Reform, he plainly stated “it is no secret that the [US] 
Government classifies too much information” (Devine, 2011). At his 
confirmation hearing, the Director of National Intelligence, James R. 
Clapper stated, “We do over-classify. We can be a lot more liberal, I think, 
about declassifying, and we should be.” Even President Barack Obama 
publicly acknowledged, “effective measures to address the problem of 
over-classification” (Aftergood, 2010a) are needed. What has not as yet 
been clearly defined and acknowledged is an understanding of the effects 
of over-classification, including its contribution to the unauthorized 
disclosure of information.  
• Information sharing is critical to both U.S. security and U.S. 
democracy. Over-classification leads to a degradation in U.S. ability to 
engage effectively in homeland security efforts by reducing the flow of 
critical information across agencies and levels of government. 
Additionally, transparency through public information sharing is a critical 
component of U.S. democracy. Excessive government secrecy and over-
classification has reduced government accountability by obstructing the 
public’s ability to seek disclosure of government-held information (The 
Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee, 2009). An 
informed public is necessary to ensure that the U.S. Government is acting 
appropriately and in the best interests of the people for whom it purports 
to work. 
• Homeland security efforts require public trust and support to 
succeed. The homeland security enterprise is comprised of entities from 
all disciplines and levels of government, including the public. From 
suspicious activity reporting and contributing to the deterrence of terrorist 
activities, to leveraging public preparedness to empower communities, 
help minimize fear, and diminish the effectiveness of terrorist tactics, the 
public plays a key role in homeland security efforts (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). The Final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report) 
found that existing trends of over-classification deprived intelligence and 
law enforcement of a potent weapon against terrorism: an alert and well-
informed American public (National Commision On Terrorist Attacks 
Upon The United States, 2004). Over-classification and the accompanying 
lack of transparency may have eroded public trust in the government, 
resulting in a decrease in security as well. Additionally, decreased trust in 





• The ability to keep secrets and maintain control of classified 
information will continue to decrease. Don Burke, the head of the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s “Intellipedia” project, has said that in 15 
years, there will be no more secrets (Spaulding, 2010). Wikileaks has 
demonstrated the ability to leak and propagate information to a worldwide 
audience, and while this might seem to bolster the justification for the 
current U.S. policies and culture of over-classification, overloading the 
government classification system actually weakens its ability to protect the 
truly important information (Stewart, 2010). An old saying from the 1960s 
and 1970s supports this premise, that “when everything is secret—nothing 
is secret” (Agrell, 2002). If the United States continues on its path to try 
and maintain the status quo with regard to secrecy instead of adapting, it 
will find itself unprepared and behind the curve when the “lights are 
turned up” (Spaulding, 2010). 
• Decreasing over-classification will save U.S. taxpayer money. 
Particularly during the current time of economic concern, it is prudent to 
include the cost-savings associated with significantly decreasing U.S. 
Government over-classification. In FY2009, the costs associated with 
government security classification were approximately $8.8 billion 
dollars, not including intelligence agencies’ expenditures (Kosar, 2010). 
By reducing the amount of classified information, the U.S. Government 
would see a decrease in expenditures associated with safeguarding 
information. 
• Whistleblowing is a civic duty. Modern society as a whole accepts and 
understands that misdeeds and wrongdoing occur, and implements 
measures to identify and correct those actions. Through the establishment 
of IG, the GAO and Internal Affairs in the public sector, and both internal 
and external auditing bodies in the private sector, organizations conduct 
self-evaluations and submit to outside oversight. Whistleblowing is an 
important part of this process, as whistleblowers are in a unique position 
to observe misconduct in their organizations (Miethe, 1999). Multiple 
studies have been conducted on fraud detection, and not only have the 
results of these studies supported the role of whistleblowers in detecting 
fraud, they even go as far to identify whistleblowers as the “single most 
effective source of information in both detecting and rooting out corporate 
criminal activity” (Kohn, 2011). From the earliest days of this republic, as 
far back as 1778, Congress has repeatedly used the term “duty” to describe 
the act of whistleblowing.  
• The government is committed to providing whistleblower protections. 
Whistleblowing is at the heart and soul of the 1st Amendment, 
establishing the right of the people to expose wrongdoing and demand 
accountability of their leadership (Kohn, 2011). Since that time, with the 




Reform Act and the subsequent Whistleblower Protection Act, Congress 
has displayed support for whistleblowers, using legislation to protect and 
promote the act of whistleblowing. It even has gone so far as to explicitly 
state, “The Committee intends that disclosures be encouraged. The OSC 
[Office of Special Counsel], the [Merit Systems Protection] Board, and the 
courts should not erect barriers to disclosures which will limit the 
necessary flow of information from employees who have knowledge of 
government wrongdoing” (U.S. Senate, 2002).  
• Whistleblowers are in large part motivated by patriotism and loyalty. 
Research into whistleblowing has concluded that despite the assumptions 
to the contrary, no “whistleblowing personality” exists. The motivations 
for whistleblowers are neither total altruism, nor total self-interest. 
Whistleblowers are impacted more by situational factors than dispositional 
ones, and often are faced with a challenge of loyalties. Their “loyalty to 
the agency and colleagues often gets pitted against loyalty to the public 
interest” (Johnson, 2003), and they are forced to choose between the two, 
which has been called the “choiceless choice,” for their loyalty to principle 
and a commitment to preventing harm in the service of the nation 
outweighs all other factors. Whistleblowers choose to act in the face of 
serious risks of retaliation and reprisal, and should be treated as 
performing a heroic act.  
• Anonymity is a positive thing for whistleblowers. Overwhelming 
authority and group pressure to conform and prioritize organizational 
loyalty have dominated the current environment. Cultural and societal 
demands reinforce that pressure to not ‘make waves’ among employees. In 
these situations, providing employees with anonymity can actually 
promote breaking rank and whistleblowing, which can be seen in the 
increased use of hotlines and anonymous tips in government, law 
enforcement, and the private sector. Through increased availability of 
anonymity in whistleblower submission processes, it is likely that the 
amount of whistleblowing overall would increase significantly.  
• Fourth and Fifth Estates provide alternatives to the government 
process. The Fourth Estate has played a role in government transparency 
back to the 18th century. The media has served as a government 
‘watchdog,’ providing transparency and accountability through the 
application of public pressure. The Fourth Estate has provided 
whistleblowers an alternative way to achieve positive change, often 
without the personal risks associated with the authorized processes. 
However, with the decline of investigative journalism and the increase in 
political influence over the Fourth Estate, along with the rise of the 
Internet and social media as a communication platform, Fifth Estate 
organizations (such as Wikileaks) have provided whistleblowers another 




access to a worldwide audience, Fourth and Fifth Estate submissions 
provide greater incentives for whistleblowers than the current authorized 
processes. 
• Public trust in the government has declined. As of April 2011, public 
distrust and anger towards the government had risen to 86 percent. With 
regard to whistleblowing and transparency, the actions of the Obama and 
Bush administrations have only served to increase public (and 
whistleblower) distrust. Creating a circumstance in which the head of the 
organization responsible for investigating retaliation on behalf of 
whistleblowers, is in fact, conducting retaliatory practices, combined with 
the Obama Administration’s unparalleled prosecution of whistleblowers 
(significantly more than any previous administration (Greenwald, 2010) 
have significantly damaged public perception and trust in the government 
process. When further acknowledging that the Congressional approval 
rating has fallen to approximately 13% as of December 2010 (the lowest 
in Gallup history), little doubt remains that public trust has declined, and it 
will take significant efforts to rebuild it (Jones, 2010).  
• Public trust can be increased through the use of third parties. Third 
parties have traditionally been used to overcome issues of trust, and 
examples can be found in the areas of E-commerce, mediation, secure 
communications, and online transactions. Even the government has used 
third parties to promote accountability through the creation of semi-
independent investigation organizations, such as IG and the GAO. 
Guidance to whistleblowers often includes a recommendation to find an 
advocacy agent or proxy, who can serve to represent their interests and 
provide additional protections. Through the careful selection and 
application of a third party, the U.S. Government can increase its 
credibility and overall public trust in its efforts. 
• Technology exists to provide anonymity to whistleblowers. While no 
technological solution can provide 100% anonymity, measures can be 
applied to provide significant identity protections for whistleblowers. 
Through the use of proxy servers, such as The Onion Router (TOR) or a 
third party Virtual Private Network (VPN), and ‘good hygiene,’ 
whistleblowers can significantly increase their ability to keep their 
identities secret (at least from the government organization to which they 
are submitting their report). However, anonymity often comes at the cost 
of information security. 
• Current options for whistleblowing are inadequate. Currently, many 
options exist for both the authorized and unauthorized submission of 
whistleblower information. Authorized options come with significant risks 
to the whistleblowers, even in cases of government sponsored 




legislation are inadequate. Even fewer protections exist for employees of 
national security organizations. Based on the realities of the current 
whistleblowing environment and the government’s inability to address 
these issues, employees are being encouraged either to stay silent or to 
report wrongdoing through unauthorized channels. However, unauthorized 
channels come with their share of drawbacks including issues with 
anonymity, the increasing ability of political pressures to affect Fourth 
Estate organizations, and the very real risk of the disclosure of 
information, which could have serious impacts on U.S. national security—




IV.  SOLUTIONS 
In national security there is a culture of confidentiality, the need to protect 
the nation’s most sensitive information. In homeland security there’s an 
expectation of transparency: it’s not a need to know, it’s a duty to share, 
it’s an expectation to share. In national security there’s unity of command. 
In homeland security, it’s a unity of effort. 
- Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security (Bellavita, 
2011) 
A. DEFINITION OF SUCCESS 
It is clear that whistleblowing serves as a checks and balances system for the 
government bureaucracy, helping to bypass administrative roadblocks and to provide a 
mechanism through which homeland security can monitor and increase efficiency in its 
operations. However, homeland security also deals with information that can be of a 
sensitive or secret nature, the unauthorized disclosure of which can cause damage to both 
homeland security efforts and national security. By creating an authorized process 
through which homeland security employees can submit whistleblowing information 
without fear of reprisals, it may increase the likelihood of whistleblowers reporting issues 
in the first place, and reduce the number of leaks to unauthorized recipients 
(media/stateless news organizations). 
Based on the background and analysis sections of this thesis, specifically the 
conclusions above, it is possible to identify a number of potential solutions to the 
whistleblowing problem. However, prior to the evaluation of these solutions, criteria 
must be established by which any potential solution for whistleblowing can be measured. 
To develop evaluation criteria, it is important to define success for any whistleblowing 
solution. That definition is as follows: 
To promote the voluntary disclosure of information by any man or woman 
who reasonably believes that organizational wrongdoing has occurred, the 
facilitation of corrective action to address the wrongdoing, and providing 
for the protection of the submitter while maintaining information security, 




 B. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Two primary objectives any whistleblowing solution must have to facilitate the 
whistleblowing process successfully are as follows.  
• Acceptance by whistleblowers: In the absence of legitimate protections 
against retaliation, and based on the needs identified in the analysis, the 
recommended solution must meet or exceed the minimum needs of 
whistleblowers to be successful. The minimum needs for whistleblowers 
include the following.  
• Anonymity. Defined as the inability of the government sufficiently 
to identify the subject (whistleblower) from within a set of subjects 
(all government employees.) This definition has been derived from 
Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Hansen’s Anonymity, Unlinkability, 
Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity 
Management—A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology.  
• Feedback. Whistleblowers require feedback associated with their 
report, including confirmation from the government to the 
whistleblower that the information has been received and follow-
up information regarding the action that will be taken.  
• Corrective Action. Whistleblowers submit their reports with the 
hope of facilitating corrective action to address the wrongdoing.  
• Acceptance by the government: Based on the needs identified in the 
analysis model, the recommended solution must meet or exceed the 
minimum needs of the government to be successful. The minimum needs 
for the government are as follows. 
• Information Security. Defined as the protection of information 
from access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction by unauthorized third parties. This definition has been 
derived from the U.S. Code, title 44 § 3542.  
• Legality and Political Acceptability. To implement any 
recommended solution, it must adhere to all current laws and legal 
requirements, and it must also be deemed “politically acceptable” 
or in ‘government speak’—has to pass the “ho-ho test.” 
• Issues involving cost as an evaluative measure: Government activities are 
often measured using a cost metric, and based on (in situations where 
possible) return on investment. In this case, however, cost is not a primary 
evaluative factor, as it is extremely difficult to place value on homeland 
security whistleblowers (as opposed to corporate/wall street 
whistleblowing to the Securities and Exchange Commission that can be 




Using the above criteria, it is possible to evaluate potential solutions to the current 
problems facing government whistleblowers. While it would be difficult quantitatively to 
measure the criteria independently, a qualitative approach is useful whereby solutions are 
ranked relative to the status quo and each other for anonymity, feedback, corrective 
action, and for its ability to meet government requirements for information security. What 
follows employs theoretical sensitivity to conduct the “ho-ho test” (Tarbet, 2009) for 
political acceptability. 
C. SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS 
Current U.S. whistleblower policies attempt to provide protections by addressing 
retaliation and retribution after they have occurred, although success has been limited. As 
clearly identified in the analysis section of this thesis, the status quo regarding options for 
whistleblowers is unacceptable, with both authorized and unauthorized solutions failing 
to meet the evaluation criteria and falling short of achieving success as defined above. 
Through the innovative application of technology and the development or revision of the 
current DHS submission processes, it would be possible to provide whistleblower 
protections prior to retaliation. 
Note: Solutions that involve direct disclosure to the Fourth or Fifth Estates has not 
been included. The legal status of Fourth Estate solutions (such as the sites set up by The 
Wall Street Journal and Al-Jazeera) is questionable at best, and falls short on the criteria 
for both whistleblowers and the government. Fifth Estate solutions are not permissible 
within U.S. law.  
It is important to keep in mind that 100% security does not exist or is possible, 
just as regards 100% anonymity. The steps outlined herein are only one piece of the 
overall puzzle, and their success is very dependent upon the actions of both the submitter 
and the government. No process will work based on the needs of one party (government 






of trust in the process. If the government is committed to taking steps to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure of information, it needs to provide an alternative that does not 
jeopardize the employee’s livelihood.  
At first glance, two possibilities may address both the whistleblowers and the 
Government’s concerns. 
These options are based on the following key components. 
• The government establishes a submission site based on an apache-ssl 
server (or equivalent) to ensure appropriate end-to-end encryption is used 
to maintain information security. 
• The government provides the ‘public-key fingerprint’ for its submission 
site to employees in a non-traceable way (perhaps in their “new employee 
packet” or on the DHS Intranet), to allow whistleblowers to authenticate 
the government’s certificate and preventing Man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks. 
• Submitters practice ‘good hygiene’ with regard to their actions and 
submission, including stripping all identifiable information from their 
submission, running malware/spyware and virus scanners, and taking 
precautions when using technology to submit information (not browsing 
openly while they browse anonymously) to prevent overlap and 
java/cookie exploits. 
• Submitters only use these options periodically. For example, if users are 
constantly submitting information to the government server using TOR, 
trend/traffic analysis can be used to identify them. 
1. Option 1: Whistleblowers and Internet Anonymity 
Option 1 is a solution almost entirely implemented by whistleblowers, using the 
Internet to provide anonymity as they submit to authorized government channels (such as 
the OSC, DHS IG, or GAO), which could be accomplished by using their home computer 
and by downloading and leveraging the TOR Browser (Tor, n.d.b.)—a self-contained 
instance of TOR with many of the vulnerabilities disabled. This option is primarily 
designed for the average government employee who does not have much experience with 






or a third party VPN, as long as they are aware of the logging/information sharing 
policies of the company they choose. With this solution, it would not be possible legally 
to submit sensitive or classified information. 
2. Option 2: Government Established VPN 
In this case, the government would create a VPN service hosted by DHS or 
Congress. This VPN would be solely for submitting whistleblower claims, and access 
could be provided to all government employees. This VPN would provide anonymity to 
the submitter, while ensuring that any appropriate measures are taken to ensure 
information security. With this solution, it would be possible legally to submit sensitive 










Table 1.   Analysis of the Options 
Anonymity: Option 1 is better than option 2 in terms of providing the best 
protections for the whistleblower, ensuring anonymity, which is largely due to the actual 
or perceived issues associated with government sponsored ‘hotlines.’ While the 
technology associated with option 2 may in fact be superior to option 1, public distrust in 







Feedback: Both option 1 and option 2 suffer from the same problem in terms of 
feedback. It is difficult for any solution to provide feedback while maintaining the 
anonymity of the submitter. Option 2 would have a slight advantage, in that the 
government could establish a process through which whistleblowers are issued a case 
number, and are able to follow up with their submission on a public site.  
Corrective Action: As with feedback, both options fall short on this criterion. The 
likelihood of corrective action is not dependent upon how the submission is made, as any 
submissions to authorized recipients (IGs, GAO, or Congress) have the potential for 
inaction. 
Information Security: Option 2 is clearly superior to option 1 in terms of 
information security. By using a government sponsored VPN, the information is more 
likely to remain securely within the government, while both TOR and third-party VPNs 
allow for the possibility of the information to be intercepted. Unlike with option 2, it 
would be impossible legally to submit classified information using option 1. 
Legal/Political Acceptability: Option 2 is superior to option 1 in terms of 
legal/political acceptability as well. If the government chooses to institute a new policy 
for whistleblowers, it is more likely to be accepted and authorized than if whistleblowers 
took it upon themselves to use the Internet for submission. 
In examining both options based on the evaluation criteria, it is clear that neither 
of these solutions has the ability to meet the needs of both whistleblowers and the 
government. Option 1 would likely be rejected by the government due to concerns about 
information security and legal/political acceptability, while option 2 would be 
disregarded by whistleblowers as not providing them protections through anonymity, 
largely due to lack of trust/credibility. Additionally, neither of these options has the 
ability to address corrective action in any way, making them unacceptable in terms of 





Nevertheless, with a review of the problem, the evaluation criteria, and the 
shortfalls associated with the first two options, a third possibility emerges. This option is 
based on the foundation for the technological solution proposed by option 2, but relies on 
a third party to address the issues of distrust and lack of credibility.  
3. Option 3: Government Sponsored Third Party VPN 
In this case, the government would form partnership with a NGO with credibility 
for promoting and maintaining anonymity, and authorize the creation of a VPN service 
hosted by the identified NGO. This VPN would be solely for submitting whistleblower 
claims, and access could be provided to all government employees. Policies would have 
to be established to ensure that the NGO would meet the whistleblowers’ expectations of 
anonymity, while also ensuring the government’s requirements for information security 
are met. With this solution, it would be possible to explore the submission of sensitive 
and classified information. Additionally, this option would also include a tiered reporting 
process, the application of which would prompt corrective action and provide 
accountability through escalation. 
 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Anonymity Good Unknown Good
Feedback questionable questionable questionable
Corrective Action questionable questionable Good
Information Security questionable Good Good




Table 2.   Analysis of Option 3 
Anonymity: Option 3 is superior to both options 1 and 2 in terms of providing the 






technological protections possible thorough the use of a third-party VPN (with strict 
policies against the logging of IP addresses), and with an appropriate selection of a third 
party, would lend credibility and increase public trust in the process. 
Feedback: Option 3 suffers from the same problems as options 1 and 2 in terms of 
feedback. It is difficult for any solution to provide feedback while maintaining the 
anonymity of the submitter. Options 2 and 3 would have a slight advantage, in that the 
government could establish a process through which submitters are issued a case number, 
and are able to follow up with their submission on a public site.  
Corrective Action: With option 3, comes the tiered reporting process, similar to 
the one discussed above, which would prompt corrective action and provide 
accountability through the possibility of escalation. In cases in which one tier fails to act, 
the next tier would be activated, which significantly benefit the government in that it 
would provide the opportunity to address reported issues prior to their public release (or 
instead of their public release).  
Information Security: As option 3 is a government sponsored/approved third party 
and based on the technology solution proposed in option 2, it shares superiority to option 
1 in terms of information security. By using a government sponsored third-party VPN, 
the information is more likely to remain securely within authorized government channels, 
while both TOR and unauthorized third-party VPNs allow for the possibility of the 
information to be intercepted. Option 3 is similar to option 2 in that it would be possible 
legally to submit classified information. 
Legal/Political Acceptability: The one area in which option 3 falls short of option 
2 is in terms of political acceptability. Legally, the government regularly authorizes third-
party contractors to have access to sensitive and classified information. However, this 
option does push the boundaries of political acceptability both through the injection of a 
third party into the disclosure process and through the creation of a tiered submission 





The proposal of a third-party solution requires the development of additional 
evaluation criteria. Two primary factors drive the selection of the third-party 
organization, its ability to engender public trust and lend credibility to the process, and its 
current financial disposition. As with the application of any technology and the 
implementation of policy, associated funding must be available. To avoid conflict of 
interest situations, it is important that funding from the government be provided directly 
through Congress (instead of through one agency, e.g., DHS). The amount of funding the 
organization receives from the government (beyond just the funding for this process) 
should not exceed 2–3% of the organization’s total income, and the organization itself 
must provide transparency on its budget numbers. Two additional factors should be 
noted, the organizations’ willingness to participate in the process, and the government’s 
willingness to engage with that organization. 
Two types of non-governmental organizations could meet the criteria identified 
above. The first is whistleblowing advocate organizations, such as the Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO), the Government Accountability Project (GAP), and the 
Sunlight foundation. The second type includes Internet privacy and civil liberty 
organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC). A consortium approach could also be effective in the 
application of this process.  
D. EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN 
As discussed above, even if a technological solution was able to provide 100% 
confidentiality/anonymity (which it cannot), arguably the most significant vulnerabilities 
are associated with an individual’s due diligence in scrubbing any information submitted 
for other potential identifiers. Electronic documents often contain watermarks and 
electronic signatures that can be tracked, emails can be used to identify the recipients, and 
the more limited the access associated with the information being submitted, the more 
likely the individual submitter could be identified. For example, the submission of details 
from a meeting with few attendees or a sensitive memo or email with limited recipients 




Whistleblower’s Handbook and The Art of Anonymous Activism promote ‘good hygiene’ 
and identify ‘self-help tactics’ that whistleblowers can use to protect themselves. These 
tactics include understanding whistleblower’s rights and limitations, avoiding breaking 
the law, identifying and using an advocacy partner (outside organization to act on the 
whistleblower’s behalf), documenting information thoroughly, and not using government 
resources or operating on government time (Kohn, 2011; Project on Government 
Oversight, 2002). This information would need to be made publicly available to any 
employee considering whistleblowing to ensure awareness of the risks, so that the 
appropriate measures can be taken to decrease the likelihood of identification and 
potential retaliation. Furthermore, the education of employees as to the process itself 
needs to be a high priority. In an American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE) survey, 87% of respondents were not aware of how to contact their 
whistleblowing hotline, 62% did not know where to get the number, and only 22% had 
seen the number posted in their work area (Johnson, 2003). By prioritizing and promoting 
responsible disclosure through the modification and utilization of existing trainings (such 
as the No Fear Act training), online information sites (DHS Intranet), employee welcome 
packets, reminder emails and posters (such as the Operational Security posters found 
everywhere in DHS offices), employees can be informed of the process for responsible 
disclosure, as well as the associated risks. 
E. PROCESS FOR INVESTIGATING ANONYMOUS TIPS 
Some concerns about the impact of anonymity on whistleblower submissions 
have been raised, as it decreases accountability for employees making accusations. It is 
important to bear in mind that although this process encourages whistleblowing by 
providing the protections associated with anonymity, not every submission will merit 
action or in-depth investigation. A vetting process associated with whistleblower 
submissions must exist, including a prioritization (by perceived significance) and a 
preliminary investigation (to determine merit). Prioritization can be assisted through an 
identification of significance by the whistleblower during the submission process. For 




human resource complaints and issues may rank lower. With the realities associated with 
limited resources for investigating agencies (IG, the OSC, etc.), prioritizing submissions 
prior to the conduct of preliminary investigations may help address the expected increase 
in whistleblower submissions.  
The current OSC investigation process serves as an informative model on how to 
conduct investigations into whistleblower claims. The OSC process is initiated through 
the submission of a whistleblower report. The OSC has 15 days to review the information 
and determine whether further investigation is necessary. If the OSC finds substantial 
indication of wrongdoing, it informs the appropriate agency head of the matter. That 
agency head is required to conduct an investigation and, within 60 days, identify the 
following: a summary of the disclosure leading to the investigation, a description of how 
the investigation was conducted, a summary of all evidence found during the 
investigation, a list of any real or apparent violations, and a description of any action 
either taken or planned to be taken in response to the violation. Upon receipt of the 
report, the OSC reviews it and provides it to the whistleblower, who then has 15 days to 
submit any additional comments to the OSC. The OSC then transmits the agency report, 
any comments added by the whistleblower, and any additional comments from the OSC 
to the President, congressional leadership, and the congressional committee(s) holding 
jurisdiction over the agency. It is also made public on file at OSC headquarters (Project 
on Government Oversight, 2002). While the OSC process provides a good framework for 
an investigatory process, some drawbacks and issues do exist, which must be addressed 
in the proposed policy for it to be successful. These issues include the concerns about 
confidentiality of the whistleblower, the issues associated with having the accused agency 
conduct its own investigations, and ultimately, the public availability of the report.  
Through the application of an appropriate process, concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of anonymous submissions can be addressed. In cases of retaliation/reprisal 
against whistleblowers, the single most prominent tactic employed by accused agencies is 
to attack the whistleblowers on their credibility (Miethe, 1999; Kohn, 2011). By creating 




including the questions regarding their motivations (money, notoriety, etc.). It is 
impossible to collect rewards under the False Claim Act if the whistleblower is not 
identified. Through this process, on the focus is on the pursuit of the truth regarding the 
accusations of wrongdoing, rather than questioning the whistleblower.  
F. RECOMMENDATION 
The conclusions drawn in this thesis, including the policy model ultimately 
recommended, is based on the research and the findings identified above. Assuming these 
premises are true, and based on current understanding of the problem, the evaluation 
criteria, and the potential solutions available, it is recommended that the government 
establish a partnership with a non-government organization within U.S. legal jurisdiction 
(e.g., EFF, EPIC, POGO), and subsidize the establishment of a government sponsored 
whistleblower submission website and VPN. The third party would provide information 
on how whistleblowers could access their VPN to submit their information, as well as 
best practices to follow regarding information security and maintaining anonymity. The 
NGO would have to create a strict policy regarding the logging of IP addresses. The third 
party would also maintain and update the submission website with information regarding 
the status of submitted reports.  
This organization is a neutral third party, and would serve as a mediator between 
the whistleblower and the government. Its functions as broker on behalf of the 
whistleblower, submitting information to the government and following up to ensure the 
information was evaluated and appropriate actions were determined. This organization 
also functions to balance the secrecy/transparency debate, weighing the public interest 
against issues of national security. In cases in which the government has decided not to 
act (in either first or second tier submissions), the third party would have the ability to 
review the information, and discuss the issues with both parties (should the whistleblower 
choose to step forward). Decisions to escalate to public disclosure require careful 
considerations, which however, may be considered necessary in certain situations. This 





wrongdoing through the accountability provided by the additional tiers of review. 
Inaction on the part of one organization will be questioned by the subsequent level of 
oversight. 
Of the spectrum of options, ranging from achieving all of the government’s 
primary concerns to meeting the needs of whistleblowers, this option falls slightly to the 
right of center. It is not as extreme as allowing submissions to an organization like 
Wikileaks (which the status quo is currently encouraging) or the use of self-generated 
anonymity by whistleblowers. However, it does acknowledge the need for change in the 
government’s whistleblowing procedures. By bringing an NGO into the mix, the 
government takes huge steps in rebuilding public trust and legitimizing the role that 
whistleblowers play in government affairs. Regarding political acceptability and 
information security, a precedent exists for NGOs (consultants, etc.) to have access to and 
store classified information. By certifying the submission and storage process/procedures, 
the government can be sure that information security requirements are met. 
Whistleblowers are more likely to trust a NGO to maintain their anonymity (particularly 
those with a track record like the EFF’s). Establishing this policy provides 
whistleblowers who truly believe in improving government operations through the 
submission of information on fraud/waste/abuse or other types of concerns, a legitimate 
way to achieve their goal without risking their career and future on the weak 
whistleblower protections currently in place. While it may not completely eliminate leaks 
to the media or organizations, such as Wikileaks, the researcher believes those leaks will 
decrease as more whistleblowers give the government an opportunity to act on their 
submission. Additionally, by granting the NGO oversight ability, the government 
provides the whistleblower with a ‘fail safe’ mechanism. If the government fails to act, 
the NGO has the ability to escalate the release of information to the media/public. 
However, in those situations, the government can be sure to establish reasonable limits on 
that release (e.g., no names of informants, nuclear weapon design, etc.). Lastly, while this 
option is higher in cost than some other possibilities, it does achieve the best outcome for 




Regardless of the solution pursued by the government to address this problem, 
four key pillars create the foundation for success. 
• Whistleblowers must have the support of leadership—This position 
affects all aspects of whistleblower protection, from the ability of 
Congress to pass appropriate legislation, to senior leaders at the DHS and 
the OSC who must enforce that legislation. If sufficient support from 
leadership does not exist, whistleblowers will remain unprotected. 
Problems with the lack of clarity around the definition of whistleblowers, 
as well as the perception issues that have resulted from the Wikileaks 
disclosures have seriously damaged leadership support of whistleblowers. 
Until leadership can be convinced that authorized whistleblowing is 
something that warrants support, no solutions will ever be effective.  
• Legislation and policies must be clear and straightforward—Current 
U.S. legislation is a maze of contradictions, exemptions, and loopholes. 
For whistleblowers to feel protected, legislation must be developed in a 
way that allows government employees to understand it, and government 
agencies to abide by it. Many attempts have been made by the U.S. 
Government to revise current whistleblowing policy; however, the most 
recent attempt was stopped by an anonymous hold placed on the passage 
of the Whistle-blower Protection Enhancement Act in Congress, despite 
its bi-partisan support (Devine, 2011). The key to the implementation of 
any solution is support, both from leadership and the public.  
• Whistleblowing policies must enforce accountability—The multi-tiered 
approach for whistleblower submission forces initial organizations and 
oversight agencies to act upon receipt of a whistleblower’s disclosure. By 
establishing authorized alternatives for submission, it allows 
whistleblowers to retain protection for escalating disclosures, while 
encouraging agencies to act appropriately to avoid consequences.  
• Authorized channels must provide at least as much protection as 
unauthorized channels—With the current perception that whistleblowers 
can submit information anonymously to unauthorized recipients, such as 
the media or third-party organizations (such as Wikileaks), it is paramount 
that any government whistleblowing policy provide protections that 
surpass (or are at least equivalent to) the perceived protections provided 
through Internet anonymity and Fourth or Fifth Estate submissions.  
G. DRAFT POLICY 
To demonstrate the possibilities associated with implementing this solution, the 





this thesis, while demonstrating the feasibility of the recommendations. For the purposes 
of the policy below, the details associated with the name and contact information for the 
third party are false. 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Responsible Disclosure Policy 
Purpose: It is possible that during the conduct of their everyday jobs, employees 
may witness a variety of types of organizational wrongdoing. Employees are then faced 
with a dilemma; do they stay silent, or report the wrongdoing? If they decide to report it, 
how do they go about it and to whom should they go? Reporting organization misconduct 
or ‘whistleblowing,’ is the duty of every employee, however, if conducted incorrectly or 
through unauthorized channels, the disclosure of sensitive information can have 
damaging effects. This policy is designed to establish the process through which DHS 
employees may conduct whistleblowing in a safe, secure manner, without unintended 
consequences, which can jeopardize homeland security. 
DHS has partnered with the “Neutral (and yet) Trusted Party” (NTP) organization 
for the purposes of developing and executing this Responsible Disclosure Process. NTP 
has been funded by Congress to develop the Responsible Disclosure Information System 
(RDIS), a website where whistleblowers can submit information anonymously and 
receive feedback and status updates on their submission.  
Goals of Responsible Disclosure: 
1) Ensure that instances of organizational wrongdoing are reported in a 
timely and efficient manner. 
2) Minimize the risks of retaliation and reprisals against employee 
whistleblowers. 
3) Provide the opportunity for the Department of Homeland Security to 
address issues internally, prior to, or in place of (in cases involving 
sensitive national security information), full (public) disclosure. 
4) Promote prompt adjudication and resolution of organizational misconduct 
by the Department of Homeland Security through increased accountability 




5) Increase public trust in government and minimize the amount of 
antagonism that often exists between parties due to the lack of consistent 
and explicit disclosure practices. 
6) Reduce disclosures to unauthorized parties by providing a clear and 




Whistleblowing: the voluntary disclosure by any man or woman acting in the 
public interest who, reasonably believes that a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; 
mismanagement; a waste of funds; an abuse of authority; a danger to public health; 
and/or a danger to public safety has occurred and reports that information to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action. 
Organizational Wrongdoing/Misconduct: the actions by an organization or 
individual that result in ‘a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; a 
waste of funds; an abuse of authority; a danger to public health; and/or a danger to 
public safety.’ 
Responsible Disclosure: the disclosure of organizational wrongdoing to the 
responsible party for a predetermined amount of time, to allow for 
modification/adaptation to address the wrongdoing prior to or in place of full disclosure. 
Limited Disclosure: the disclosure of organizational wrongdoing to as few 
(specifically authorized) parties as possible, to prompt additional investigatory or 
corrective action to address perceived organizational wrongdoing prior to full 
disclosure.  
Full Disclosure: the disclosure of organizational wrongdoing to the public with 
the intent of using public exposure to pressure accused organizations to investigate and 







Major Roles in Disclosure: 
Reporter: the individual who witnesses and discloses the organizational 
wrongdoing/misconduct. Also known as ‘Whistleblowers’ or ‘Lamplighters.’ 
Coordinator: the individual or organization that serves as a neutral mediator and 
works with the reporter and the Investigator to facilitate the whistleblowing process and 
to ensure that responsible disclosure occurs prior to full disclosure. Coordinators may 
serve as proxies for reporters, helping to verify claims, resolve conflicts, and mediate 
between parties to resolve the issue in a satisfactory manner, with a minimum of 
potentially harmful consequences. NTP serves as the Coordinator for the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Responsible Disclosure process. Also known as 
‘Ombudsman’ or ‘Advocates.’ 
Investigator: the individual or organization who receives the report and is 
responsible for determining whether there is merit to the claim for examining the 
accused. Tier One investigators include the Department’s Office of the Inspector General, 
DHS Component Offices of Inspectors General, or the Office of Special Counsel. Tier 
Two investigators include Congress, the Government Accountability Office and the 
White House.  
Leadership: the individual or organization that is able to effect action to address 
and correct instances of verified organizational wrongdoing. 
Accused: the individual or organization about which the initial disclosure was 
made. 
Who is covered: This policy covers all civil service employees of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, its detailees and its contractors. This includes all DHS 
components, including those that are identified as part of the Intelligence Community and 







Tiers of Responsible Disclosure: 
This policy is based on a tiered process for responsible disclosure. The three tiers 
are: 
a. Tier-One—Internal: Authorized Tier One reporting includes the 
submission of reports within the originating agency/component (to include 
within the Reporter’s chain of command), to the Department’s Office of 
the Inspector General, DHS Component Offices of Inspectors General, or 
the Office of Special Counsel. 
b. Tier-Two—External Limited Disclosure: External reporting includes the 
submission of reports to Congress, the Government Accountability Office 
or the White House.  
c. Tier-Three—External Full Disclosure: In circumstances where neither 
Tier One or Tier Two is able to facilitate corrective action, full disclosure 
can be made to the media/public. Full Disclosure can only be initiated by 
the Coordinator. 
 
All reports submitted will be reviewed initially through the first tier, at which 
point the decision to escalate to additional tiers can be determined by the Reporter or 
Coordinator. However, in situations where Tier Two investigations have not resulted in 
action, the Reporter cannot escalate to Tier Three without the consent of the Coordinator. 
The Coordinator is a neutral third party, serving as a mediator between the Reporter and 
the Accused/Leadership. They also function to balance the secrecy/transparency debate, 
weighing the public interest against issues of national security. Decisions to escalate to 
the third tier require careful consideration, but they may very well be justified under 
certain circumstances. This process promotes action by Leadership in addressing 
organizational wrongdoing through the accountability provided by the additional tiers of 
review. In the Responsible Disclosure Process, inaction will be questioned by the 
subsequent tiers.  
 
Phases of Responsible Disclosure 
1) Discovery—One or more individuals discover or witness activities that 




2) Reporting—A Reporter submits a report to the coordinator, who then 
removes any of the Reporter’s personally identifiable information from the 
submission. The coordinator then forwards the report to an appropriate 
investigator, including the identity of the accused and the details 
surrounding the suspected wrongdoing. The Investigator and/or 
Coordinator will provide confirmation to the Reporter that their 
submission was received through the DHS Responsible Disclosure 
Information Site (RDIS) and that the submission has been assigned a 
unique case number for the submission.  
3) Investigation—The investigator prioritizes and conducts a two part 
analysis to determine the merits of the submission: within 15 days, a pre-
investigation analysis is conducted to determine whether further 
investigation is required. If it is determined that more analysis is 
necessary, a detailed investigation is conducted within 30 days, in order to 
confirm or disprove the accusations of organizational wrongdoing by the 
reporter.  
4) Adjudication—Upon completion of the investigation, the Investigator 
and/or the Coordinator updates the RDIS with the investigation status. The 
Investigator details conclusions from their investigation to the DHS 
Leadership for a 15-day review period. Upon receipt of the Investigator’s 
report, DHS Leadership will take action (where required) to address any 
legitimate issues. 
5) Follow-up—DHS Leadership will provide information on their decision 
to (or not to) act, to the Investigator and Coordinator. The Coordinator will 
then update the RDIS with the actions taken by Leadership to address the 
issues. The Reporter has 30 days from the conclusion of the investigation 
phase (90 days from initial submission) to review (using their case number 
through the RDIS) and take appropriate action as necessary. Appropriate 
Reporter actions include providing additional information, coming 
forward as an identified witness (losing the protections of anonymity), or 
escalating to additional tiers as appropriate. In situations where rewards 
are applicable (e.g. under the False Claim Act), the Reporter will have the 
opportunity to come forward and claim them within this phase. Only 
reports on issues of wrongdoing that do not have National Security 
restrictions will be publicly available.  
6) Escalation—In cases where the Investigator was unable to confirm 
organizational wrongdoing and/or DHS Leadership has chosen not to take 
action, the Reporter can escalate the report to a Tier Two Investigator 
through the RDIS. Should the reporter decline to continue to be involved 
in the process, the Coordinator can serve as a proxy for the Reporter, and 
escalate on the Reporter’s behalf. At that time, the Responsible Disclosure 




Note: In situations where Tier Two investigations have not resulted in 
action, the Reporter cannot escalate to Tier Three. All Tier Three 
escalations must be conducted by Coordinator.  
 
Responsible Disclosure of Classified Information: 
There may be circumstances that arise which require the disclosure of classified 
information in DHS Responsible Disclosure Process. While the publically accessible 
RDIS can only be used for the submission of unclassified information (including 
Controlled Unclassified Information), the Responsible Disclosure Process does allow for 
the submission of classified information.  
To submit a report on organizational wrongdoing that involves classified 
information, the following steps are recommended: 
1. Submit a report on the RDIS that provides an overview of the issue, and 
check the “classified submission” box. This will alert NTP that a classified 
submission is forthcoming. In the overview, do not include any classified 
information.  
Please note: in order to maintain anonymity, this information MUST be submitted 
to the Coordinator. Any submissions sent directly to an Investigator will 
retain personally identifiable information.  
2. For SECRET information, submit supporting documentation through the 
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) or the Secure Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNET). Submissions can be made to the RDIS 
through its classified site at http://NTP.SGOV.GOV/RDIS, or via email to 
RDIS@NTP.SGOV.GOV.  
3. For TOP SECRET information, submit supporting documentation through 
the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). 
Submissions can be made through http://NTP.IC.GOV/RDIS or via email 
at RDIS@NTP.IC.GOV. 
Submitting information via a government computer (as is required with classified 
information) provides the opportunity for the identity of Reporters to be discovered 
through computer logs and monitoring. For additional information or support regarding 
the submission of classified information, please see the help page of the RDIS or call 





Protections provided through the DHS Responsible Disclosure Process: 
The NTP has created a Virtual Private Network (VPN), through which Reporters 
can securely submit information either to the Tier One Investigator of their choice, or 
directly to the Coordinator (NTP). In circumstances where the submission is to the 
Coordinator, steps will be taken to ensure any submission has been stripped of 
information, which could serve to identify the Reporter, prior to submission to an 
Investigator. NTP will then proceed to serve as a proxy for the Reporter, escalating 
through the tiers as necessary in the absence of Reporter participation.  
This process provides Reporters (whistleblowers) with the protections afforded 
through the anonymous submission of reports. Additional protections can be provided by 
using the Coordinator to serve as a proxy for the Reporter (although that is not required in 
the Tier One or Tier Two). Reporters utilizing the Responsible Disclosure Process who 
suffer retaliations or reprisals for their actions are protected under current U.S. law, 
specifically the First Amendment and the Whistleblower Protection Act. In those 
situations, contact the Coordinator immediately to receive support and assistance. Any 
Reporter who initiates the Responsible Disclosure process, who then proceeds to full 
disclosure without the consent/support of the Coordinator, forfeits all rights to 
protections and anonymity.  
RDIS is based on an apache-ssl server to ensure appropriate end-to end encryption 
is used to maintain information security. The public-key fingerprint for the submission 
site is available on the DHS Intranet, and can be used to authenticate the RDIS certificate 
and prevent ‘Man-in-the-middle’ attacks. In all cases, NTP will not log the IP address of 
the submitter. If possible, do not use DHS/Government computers to submit information 
to the RDIS (except in cases of classified disclosures), as this severely impacts the 






Reporters should practice good hygiene with regards to their actions and 
submission, including stripping all personally identifiable information from their 
submission, running malware/spyware and virus scanners, and taking precautions when 
using technology to submit information (not browsing openly while they browse 
anonymously) to prevent overlap and java/cookie exploits. 
More information regarding the risks associated with Responsible Disclosure, and 
the steps Reporters can take to maximize their protections is available on the RDIS 
















V.  CONCLUSION 
A. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
The solutions proposed in this thesis have been designed in a way that allows for 
immediate implementation, utilizing currently available technology and carefully 
designed business processes (data rules) to provide protection to whistleblowers through 
anonymity. A limited scope pilot program, within one or more components of DHS, 
would provide an excellent opportunity to collect data on employee use of the process 
and to identify any issues prior to a large-scale investment of funds. While this thesis 
makes a convincing case of the importance of whistleblowers in government, a number of 
obstacles still stand in the way of implementation. For any realistic possibility of the 
implementation of this solution, it is important to have a clear understanding of the 
influential factors at play.  
As a means of evaluating future utility of the solutions proposed herein, 
awareness of how the environment is likely to change in the near future must exist. Using 
a scenario based planning approach, three alternate futures capture (most of) the likely 
possibilities at a high level. 
• Maintenance of the status quo 
• Increased protection for whistleblowers 
• Decreased protection for whistleblowers 
By understanding each of these potential future states, it is possible to 
predict/evaluate the role (usefulness) that the proposed solution would have in each of the 
alternate futures. However, prior to the review of each scenario, some fundamentals are 
true regardless of the future environment.  
The multi-disciplinary approach proposed by this thesis (the third-party 
partnership and business processes, combined with the innovative use of technology) is 
an example of disruptive innovation. The implementation of this solution would 
undermine currently established policies and processes for whistleblowers. Current 




channels, present significant risks to the whistleblower. Clandestine/unauthorized 
processes, such as the Internet (Wikileaks) and mainstream media, represent a clear 
breach of the law, which is in conflict with the “do the right thing” mindset of many 
whistleblowers. If whistleblowers had a way to communicate identified issues through an 
authorized third party that would serve as a proxy on their behalf, it would undermine the 
current processes (both legitimate and clandestine), potentially making them obsolete. It 
would reduce the personal risk faced by whistleblowers by providing the anonymity that 
makes the clandestine approach attractive, without clearly breaking the law. If 
implemented correctly, the number of legitimate whistleblower complaints would 
increase (overall submissions would increase), and the number of whistleblowers who 
choose unauthorized avenues would be expected to decrease. 
Regardless of which of the potential scenarios actually plays out in the future, 
some people/organizations will always remain that firmly reject increased whistleblower 
protections. The primary opponents of whistleblower protections (and solutions such as 
those presented by this thesis) will continue to be those politicians, government officials, 
government contractors and corporate interests that attempt to maximize profits and/or 
increase personal gains by skirting and/or breaking laws. Unfortunately, those people do 
not identify themselves by arguing that increased oversight of/transparency into their 
activities damages their ability to break the law. Instead, they have co-opted a legitimate 
concern regarding the need for government/corporate secrecy, and maintain an inflexible 
position on it. Secrecy advocates, those who believe that secrecy for government 
(national security) or corporate (proprietary information) purposes trump the need for 
transparency, would also likely oppose some or all of the components of this solution. 
Additionally, transparency advocates, those who fall on the other end of the spectrum, 
may also oppose this solution as it does provide for a measured/tiered approach (giving 
the government the ability to address any issues/concerns prior to broader release to the 
public). To both extremes, secrecy and transparency, this solution may appear as a either 
falling short (transparency) or going too far (secrecy). This thesis acknowledges the need 
for secrecy, as well as transparency, and begins by specifically identifying the need for 




disclosure outweigh the costs of disclosure” (Stone, 2008). Acknowledging that this is a 
wicked problem, to which there may be no clear answer, it is all the more apparent that a 
balanced approach is critical. 
The multidisciplinary approach has been used in this solution to provide the 
checks and balances needed to maintain a balance between secrecy and transparency, 
without exposing whistleblowers to significant retaliation and consequences. Similar to 
those safeguards established through the creation of the three U.S. branches of 
government, creating a whistleblowing process that relies on a partnership between the 
government and an outside third party ensures accountability, moderation, and flexibility 
in the application of the solution. With multiple parties and unique perspectives involved 
in the process, it increases the likelihood of identifying issues and creating innovative 
solutions. With the rapid evolution of technology, unforeseen possibilities and 
vulnerabilities, and the ever-changing political environment, rigid adherence to a single 
process or structure is problematic. Flexibility and adaptability are key components, 
which must be built into the solution for it to be successful. The spirit of the solution, 
“facilitating the reporting of wrongdoing while providing protection to whistleblowers,” 
should be the key focus of this process. The details surrounding implementation are 
peripheral to that central goal, and can (and should) be modified as the environment 
changes. 
B. ALTERNATE FUTURES FOR THE WHISTLEBLOWING 
ENVIRONMENT 
1. Scenario 1: Status Quo 
• Congress continues to be torn on the role of whistleblowers in the 
government, publically supporting whistleblowers, however, unable to 
enact legislation that provides meaningful protections to government 
whistleblowers  
This scenario is representative of the status quo, and reflects the current 
atmosphere for both public perceptions and congressional decisions. While 
whistleblowers have generally been viewed favorably, the incident surrounding the 




as leakers/traitors, which is evident in the Obama Administration’s prosecution of 
government whistleblowers, as well as the inability of Congress to pass any revised 
whistleblower bills (whether increasing or decreasing protections).  
The solution proposed by this thesis fits very well into this scenario, and could be 
implemented as a bi-partisan, balanced solution to the problem. It would fit into the 
agenda for secrecy advocates by potentially reducing the number of unauthorized 
disclosures (to Wikileaks, Openleaks, etc.), while creating processes to improve and 
increase transparency in government affairs, a clear goal of transparency advocates.  
2. Scenario 2: Increased Protections for Whistleblowers 
• Congress changes its position and fully supports whistleblower 
protections, enacting legislation that encourages whistleblowers (through 
incentives/protections), clarifies judicial interpretations of the law, creates 
a user-friendly process for submission and review, and imposes severe 
penalties in cases of retaliation 
This scenario represents a significant shift in the mindset of the U.S. Government, 
which has historically erred on the side of secrecy over transparency (in actions if not 
words). If the U.S. Government were to take a definitively pro-whistleblower stance, 
including carefully worded legislation (to overcome judicial interpretations), significant 
allocation of resources and authorities to whistleblower protection 
agencies/organizations, and zero-tolerance for retaliation and reprisals, the 
whistleblowing environment may radically change over-time. 
In this scenario, because of the positive actions of the U.S. Government, many of 
the concerns addressed by the proposed solution would vanish. The business process and 
its associated technological components would still be useful and function as a vehicle to 
facilitate whistleblower reporting; however, the protections provided by anonymity 
would be redundant.  
3. Scenario 3: Decreased Protections for Whistleblowers 
• Congress changes its position and associates whistleblowers with 
traitors/leakers, cracks down on whistleblower protections, and 




This scenario builds upon the negative perceptions generated by the unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information, the association of whistleblowers as disloyal (rats), 
and the prosecutions of whistleblowers by the Obama Administration. The result is that 
Congress not only overturns current whistleblower protections, but also associates 
whistleblowing with traitors, establishes severe punishments for whistleblowing and 
strips resources away from agencies responsible to investigate claims of retaliation and 
reprisal, which could have a stifling effect on the whistleblowing environment, with the 
number of authorized whistleblowing reports decreasing significantly. 
In this scenario, because of the overwhelmingly negative perception of 
whistleblowing, the solution proposed by this thesis is unlikely to be implemented by the 
U.S. Government. However, it does seem likely (particularly based on the response of the 
Internet to legislation, such as the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)) that a similar solution 
would be developed outside of the government, and organizations, such as Wikileaks 
would likely see a significant, if not exponential, increase in activity on their site 
(Greenberg, 2011).  
Of all three of these scenarios, the solution proposed by this thesis is best suited to 
address the current whistleblowing environment, as it provides a balanced approach that 
can appeal to both secrecy and transparency advocates. If a shift occurs to either of the 
two extremes, the rationale for and/or likelihood of implementation decreases 
significantly. With the understanding that the political winds can shift rapidly in either 
direction, any of these scenarios is possible. If a near-term implementation of the 
proposed solution occurs, it can be adapted or modified as needed for future scenarios, at 
little cost.  
If implemented, regardless of the future environment, this solution will most 
likely result in one of the following outcomes. 
• Increased authorized whistleblowing, and decreased unauthorized 
whistleblowing 





• No effect on authorized whistleblowing, and decreased unauthorized 
whistleblowing  
• No effect on the whistleblowing environment (authorized or unauthorized) 
It is possible, albeit unlikely, that one of the following outcomes could occur. 
• Increased authorized whistleblowing, and increased unauthorized 
whistleblowing  
• Decreased authorized whistleblowing, and increased unauthorized 
whistleblowing 
• No effect on authorized whistleblowing, and increased unauthorized 
whistleblowing 
The top three likely outcomes all reflect positive changes in the whistleblowing 
environment, with the fourth likely possibility reflecting no change at all. Logically, the 
three bottom outcomes are unlikely to occur based from the implementation of this 
solution (they are more likely to result from other factors affecting the environment). The 
risks associated with implementing this solution, to include cost and the sharing of 
responsibility for secrecy/transparency with a third party are manageable, and potentially, 
offset through funding recovered from fraud/waste cases, and through appropriate 
administration/investigation of whistleblower reports.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
A few areas of future research should be explored prior to the development and 
implementation of the recommendations in this thesis. 
• Evaluation of third-party organizations—To provide for the maximum 
possibility of success, an appropriate third party must be identified. Only 
an organization that meets the criteria identified above will be able to 
provide the credibility required to increase public trust in the process. If 
the process is not trusted, it will fail. 
• Identification of appropriate investigators—Currently, multiple 
avenues exist that whistleblowers can use to submit reports, including the 
IG, the GAO, and the OSC. Clear roles and responsibilities need to be 
established that identify appropriate tier one and tier two investigators, and 






• Analyze and determine appropriate funding levels—Many of the 
problems facing government agencies with the responsibility for 
investigation stem from the lack of appropriate funding and staffing levels, 
which leads to unacceptable delays and backlogs of investigations, 
contributing to unauthorized disclosures. Any investigators must have the 
funding and staffing levels commiserate with the quantity of reports 
submitted. To reduce stovepiping and backlogs in individual 
organizations, perhaps partnerships could be formed within tier one and 
tier two investigators to distribute the workload evenly and reduce the 
probability of backlogs.  
• Develop metrics for post-implementation evaluation—While multiple 
potential outcomes have been identified, the only way to determine 
success will be through the development of clear metrics, which can be 
used to evaluate the process, identify its impact on the whistleblowing 
environment, and prompt changes as needed to support the realization of 
success.  
While this thesis has presented a solution based on a realistic need, clearly 
identified benefits, and few risks, it is important to understand one last fundamental 
element required for this solution to be realistically implemented. Regardless of the 
environment, this solution requires a champion within the government who has the 
vision, authority and resources to make this happen. This solution cannot be driven from 
the program manager level of government; it must stem from leadership and contain the 
authorities and resources necessary for implementation (initially for a pilot program, and 
ultimately, broader implementation and sustainment). However, by creating an authorized 
process through which homeland security employees can submit whistleblowing 
information without fear of reprisals, it may increase the likelihood of whistleblower 
reporting in the first place, and reduce the number of leaks to unauthorized recipients, 
which would function as a check and balance system, helping to bypass administrative 
roadblocks and providing a mechanism through which homeland security can monitor 
and increase efficiency in its operations. 
Despite the efforts of the U.S. Government and its allies, including private sector 
interests and powerful corporations, Wikileaks continues to demonstrate relevance and 
operational functionality, most recently through the release of over four million emails 




represent whistleblowing (they were hacked by representatives of the Internet 
organization Anonymous), they do serve to demonstrate further the value of the 
protection and distribution methods provided through the ‘Wikileaks model.’ Reva 
Bhalla, the Director of Analysis for Stratfor recently stated, “Wikileaks itself may 
struggle to survive but the idea that’s put out here, that anyone with the bandwidth and 
servers to support such a system can act as a prime outlet of leaks. [People] are obsessed 
with this kind of stuff. The idea behind it won’t die” (Dorling, 2012). The DHS has an 
opportunity to build upon and improve the “Wikileaks Model,” to harness its use of 
technology and process to create a solution that would meet the needs of both 
whistleblowers and the government.  
The world is constantly changing, secrets are becoming harder to maintain and 
democracy is happening in real time via the Internet around the world. The current 
mentality around whistleblower protection is inadequate, and inaction on this front will 
result in decreasing instances of authorized whistleblowing and increased unauthorized 
whistleblowing. It is brave people who do the right thing, regardless of personal cost. It is 
our duty as government officials to protect them, and to encourage accountability, 
transparency, and ethics in government operations. It is time to adapt our mindset and 
catch up to the world around us.  
The world we have created is a product of our thinking…it cannot be 
changed without changing our thinking. 




APPENDIX. RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE INFORMATION 
SYSTEM (RDIS) MOCK-UPS  
The Responsible Disclosure Information System would serve as the front-end 
interface for whistleblowers to access the DHS’s responsible disclosure process. The 
RDIS would allow whistleblowers to submit reports, receive notifications, provide 
updates, and request escalation, all with relative anonymity. The following nine screen 
shots serve as an example of what the RDIS might look like, and allow for a little more 








This introductory page would serve as the main page for the RDIS. On the right 
would be a welcome/background video given by a senior DHS official, reinforcing the 
legitimacy and importance of this process, and the role of whistleblowers in government. 
From this page, users would be able to follow links to:  
• General/background information 
• Submit a report 









This general/background information page would serve to provide users 
additional details to help users make informed decisions. This page is designed to assist 
employees who have already decided to become whistleblowers, those who are 
considering their options, as well as to educate other employees on the appropriate 
process. This page provides information on the following. 
• The definition of organizational wrongdoing and examples  
• A detailed explanation of the Responsible Disclosure Process 
• Details on the protections offered by the RDIS and the limitations 
associated with the process 





Report an Issue: Event Description 
 
 
This page is the first page of the submission process. The whistleblower would 
provide the initial report on the issue, identifying the agency, suspected wrongdoing, and 










Report an Issue: Event Description 
 
 
This page is the second page of the submission process. The whistleblower could 
submit the names of individuals; either those directly involved or people who may be 










Report an Issue: Review and Submissions 
 
 
This is the final page of the submission process. The whistleblower would review 
the information to ensure accuracy prior to submission and also create a ‘personal 













This page is the confirmation page for submission of the whistleblower’s report. It 
is important for whistleblowers to record the information here, as all three items (case 











Case Lookup: General Information 
  
 
Upon completion of the submission process, RDIS users would be directed to this 
case lookup information page, which would provide additional information about the 
process, specifically the investigation timelines, roles and responsibilities, and personal 
protections of which whistleblowers should be aware. Whistleblowers are also informed 
of when they should check into the RDIS for updated information, and the possible 








Case Lookup: Request  
  
 
At defined intervals during the Responsible Disclosure process, the RDIS will be 
updated with information on the status of the case. Through this page, whistleblowers can 
access the case status/message page by providing the case number, submission date, and 










Case Lookup: Case Details  
 
 
This case lookup page will provide the whistleblower information on the current 
status of their case. It also includes a messaging function, a vehicle through which 
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